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1  Introduction 
Since  the mid  1980s,  a  large  body  of  literature  has  developed  in which 
monetary  policy  is analyzed  in  microfounded,  dynamic  stochastic  gen 
eral  equilibrium  (DSGE) models  of  the business  cycle  with  monopolistic 
competition  and  nominal  rigidity.  The  importance  of  this New  Keyne 
sian  literature  (summarized,  for  instance,  by Woodford  2003)  for policy 
making  is evidenced  by  the  current  use  of  such models  by many  central 
banks  or  international  institutions  as  input  for policy  decisions.1  Most  of 
this  literature,  however,  relies  on monopolistic  competition  merely  as  a 
vehicle  to  introduce  price-  (or wage-)  setting  power  and  then  assume 
that price  (or  wage)  setting  is not  frictionless,  resulting  in nominal  rigid 
ity  and  a  role  for monetary  policy.  The  overwhelming  majority  of mod 
els  abstract  from  producer-entry  mechanisms  and  assumes  a  constant 
number  of  producers.  The  joint  assumptions  of monopolistic  competi 
tion  and  no  entry  raise  both  theoretical  and  empirical  questions.  First, 
absent  either  properly  designed  markup-offsetting  subsidies  or  increas 
ing  returns  of  appropriate  degree,  monopolistic  competition  in  these 
models  results  in permanent  (i.e.,  steady-state)  positive  profits,  casting 
doubts  on  the  theoretical  appeal  of  the  zero-entry  assumption.2  Further 
more,  recent  empirical  evidence  for  the United  States  has  substantiated 
the  endogenous  fluctuations  in  the number  of  producers  and  the  range 
of  available  goods  that  take  place  over  the  typical  length  of  a business 
cycle.  A  previous  literature  documented  the  strong  procyclical  behavior 
of  net  producer  entry  (measured  either  as  incorporated  firms  or  as pro 
duction  establishments).3  Bernard,  Redding,  and  Schott  (2006)  docu 
ment  how  existing  U.S.  manufacturing  establishments  devote  a  sub 
stantial  portion  of  their  production  to goods  that  they  did  not  previously 300  Bilbiie,  Ghironi,  and Melitz 
produce.  For U.S.  aggregate  manufacturing,  the value  of new  goods  pro 
duced  represents  just  under  10 percent  of  annual  manufacturing  out 
put.4  Axarloglou  (2003)  and  Broda  and Weinstein  (2007)  directly  mea 
sure  the  introduction  of  new  varieties  in  the  U.S.  economy  and 
document  a  strong  correlation  with  the  business  cycle.  Across  a wide 
sample  of U.S.  consumer  purchases,  Broda  and Weinstein  (2007)  docu 
ment  that  a  1 percent  increase  in aggregate  sales  is associated  with  a 0.35 
percent  increase  in  the  sales  of newly  introduced  products  in  that  quar 
ter.5 These  theoretical  and  empirical  observations  suggest  that  there  is 
scope  for  introducing  producer  entry  and  product  creation  in models 
with  monopolistic  competition  and  imperfect  price  adjustment,  and 
studying  the  consequences  of  endogenous  product  variety  for business 
cycle  propagation  and  policy  in  these  models. 
This  paper  takes  an  initial  step  in  this  direction  by  reintroducing  the 
endogenous  link between  product  creation  (firm  entry)  and monopolis 
tic  competition  in a DSGE  model  with  imperfect  price  adjustment.  We 
explore  the  positive  and  normative  consequences  of  endogenous  pro 
ducer  entry  and  product  variety  over  the business  cycle  by  introducing 
nominal  rigidity  into  the flexible  price  model  developed  by  Bilbiie,  Ghi 
roni,  and  Melitz  (2005?henceforth,  BGM).  We  incorporate  nominal 
rigidity  in a  standard  form  often  used  in  the  recent  New  Keynesian  lit 
erature?a  quadratic  cost  of  price  adjustment,  as  in Rotemberg  (1982).6 
The  endogenous  response  of  producer  entry?product  creation  subject 
to  sunk  entry  costs?over  the  business  cycle  provides  a key  new  trans 
mission  mechanism  in our model.  This  producer  entry,  in general  equi 
librium,  is  tied  to  the  household  saving  decisions  via  the  purchase  of 
share  holdings  in  the  portfolio  of  firms  that  operate  in  the  economy.7  In 
BGM,  we  show  that  such  a  model,  under  flexible  prices,  performs  simi 
larly  to  the  standard  real  business  cycle  (RBC) model  concerning  the 
cyclicality  of  key  U.S.  macroeconomic  aggregates  that  are  traditionally 
the  subject  of  RBC  studies.  However,  this model  can  additionally  ex 
plain  many  other  important  empirical  patterns  over  the  business  cycle, 
such  as  the  procyclicality  of  firm  entry  and  profits,  and?with  noncon 
stant  elasticity  of  substitution  (CES) preferences?the  countercyclicality 
of markups.  Significantly,  these  countercyclical  markups  are  induced 
while  still  preserving  the procyclicality  of profits  (due  to  the  response  of 
producer  entry)?a  well-known  challenge  for  the benchmark  New  Key 
nesian  model  with  sticky  prices.8 
The  introduction  of  endogenous  product  variety  in  a  sticky-price 
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existing  fixed-variety  models,  as well  as  to qualify  some  of  the  results  of 
those  models  in  the presence  of  this  new  margin.  To  start with,  the  con 
sumer  price  index  coincides  with  the price  of  each  individual  product  in 
the  symmetric  equilibrium  of  one-sector,  fixed-variety  models.  In  a 
model  with  endogenous  variety,  a meaningful  distinction  between  the 
consumer  price  index  and  the  average  product  price  arises  because  the 
welfare-relevant  consumer  price  index  varies  with  the  number  of  vari 
eties  (it is cheaper  to satisfy  a given  level  of  demand  with  more  varieties) 
for given  product  price  level.  Otherwise  put,  the price  of  each  good  rel 
ative  to  the  consumption  basket  increases  with  the  number  of  vari 
eties?the  marginal  benefit  from  consuming  the  bundle  is  thus  higher 
relative  to  the marginal  benefit  of  any  unit  of  an  individual  good,  mak 
ing  consumption  of  the basket  more  desirable.  We  show  that when  price 
rigidity  concerns  price  setting  for  individual  goods,  optimal  policy 
should  stabilize  product  prices  (the  average  price  of  output,  often  re 
ferred  to  as  producer  price  in  the  following)  rather  than  the welfare 
consistent  consumer  price  index.9 
Our  framework  also  suggests  a new  motive  for  price  stability  as  a 
desirable  policy  prescription.  Since,  as  in Rotemberg  (1982),  price  ad 
justment  costs  are  deducted  from  firm  profits,  and  these  costs  are  pro 
portional  to  (squared)  producer  price  inflation,  the  latter  acts  as  a 
distortionary  tax  on  firm  profits  in our model.  This  tax distorts  the  allo 
cation  of  resources  to product  creation  (versus  production  of  existing 
varieties)  and  induces  a  suboptimal  amount  of  product  variety  in each 
period.  This  is an  intuitive  explanation  for why  the  central  bank  should 
pursue  producer  price  stability  in our model,  and  an  extra  argument  for 
price  stability  absent  from  fixed-variety  models. 
Turning  to  implications  that  qualify  results  from  fixed-variety  mod 
els,  but  remaining  in  the  area  of  policy  prescriptions,  it  is by  now  con 
ventional  wisdom  from  the  benchmark  fixed-variety  model  without 
physical  capital  that  the  central  bank  should  follow  what  has  become 
known  as  the Taylor  Principle.  This  policy  prescription  requires  that  the 
central  bank  be  active,  in the  sense  of  increasing  the nominal  interest  rate 
more  than  one-to-one  in  response  to  increases  in  inflation.10  Perhaps 
surprisingly,  however,  the  introduction  of  physical  capital  in  the  fixed 
variety  model  changes  this  prescription  dramatically,  as  shown  by 
Dupor  (2001)  in  a  continuous-time  model  and  further  developed  by 
Carlstrom  and  Fuerst  (2005)  in  discrete  time  and  in  the  presence  of 
adjustment  costs.  Dupor  shows  that  passive  interest  rate  setting  (a  less 
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local  determinacy  and  stability,  while  Carlstrom  and  Fuerst  conclude 
that  it  is  essentially  impossible  to  achieve  determinacy  with  forward 
looking  interest  rate  setting.  In contrast  to  these  results,  the Taylor  Prin 
ciple  holds  in our  economy  in  which  capital  accumulation  takes  the  form 
of  creating  new  production  lines,  regardless  of whether  the monetary 
authority  responds  to expected  or  current  product  price  inflation.11 
The  Taylor  Principle  is restored  with  our  form  of  capital  accumulation 
precisely  because  our  framework  features  an  endogenous  price  of  capi 
tal  that  plays  a crucial  role  in  monetary  policy  transmission.  Indeed,  we 
show  that  free  entry  implies  that  the price  of  equity  shares  (the value  of 
the  firm)  appears  in  the New  Keynesian  Phillips  curve  that  governs  the 
dynamics  of  inflation.  Moreover,  a no-arbitrage  condition  links  the  real 
return  on  bonds  (which  the  central  bank  affects  by  setting  the  nominal 
interest  rate)  to  the  real  return  on  equity?the  ratio  of next  period's  div 
idends  and  share  price  to  the  current  price  of  equity.  This  identifies  a 
novel  channel  of monetary  policy  transmission  that  links  interest  rate 
setting  to  equity  prices  and,  through  free  entry  and  the  Phillips  curve, 
inflation.  In a nutshell,  a  temporary  interest  rate  cut  reduces  the  real  re 
turn  on  bonds,  inducing  the  expected  return  on  equity  to  fall  and  the 
household  to  consume  more  today.  The  decrease  in  the  expected  return 
from  investing  in product  creation  is brought  about  by  an  increase  in  to 
day's  price  of  equity  (the  value  of  the  firm)  relative  to  tomorrow's.  The 
price  of  equity  (the value  of  the  firm)  is related  to marginal  cost  (the  ra 
tio  of  the  real wage  to  labor  productivity)  by  the  free-entry  condition  in 
our model.  Marginal  cost  rises,  inducing  a fall  in  the markup  and,  by  the 
Phillips  curve,  an  increase  in  inflation.  This  transmission  of monetary 
policy  through  the  price  of  equity  is  absent  in  standard,  fixed-variety 
models,  even  when  those models  do  feature  an  endogenous  price  of  cap 
ital due  to adjustment  costs  (see Carlstrom  and  Fuerst  2005). 
Further  implications  of  explicitly  modeling  endogenous  product  cre 
ation  pertain  to  inflation  and  markup  dynamics.  As  in  the  standard 
fixed-variety  model,  a New  Keynesian  Phillips  curve  relating  producer 
price  inflation  to  its expected  value  and  the  current  markup  holds  in our 
model.  However,  endogenous  product  creation  has  important  conse 
quences  for empirical  exercises  that  estimate  Phillips  curves.  First,  in  the 
presence  of  endogenous  variety,  the markup  is not  simply  the  inverse  of 
the  labor  share  of  income,  as  in  Sbordone  (2002)  or  Gali  and  Gertler 
(1999).  In our model,  the markup  can  be  expressed  as  the  inverse  of  a  la 
bor  share  in  consumption  output,  controlling  for  labor  used  to  set  up 
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spective).  A  close  proxy  for  this  labor  share  has  been  estimated  by 
Rotemberg  and  Woodford  (1999),  and  it  is  the  relevant  variable  that 
should  be  used  to estimate  the Phillips  curve  in  the presence  of  endoge 
nous  variety.12 We  propose  an  alternative  proxy  for  the markup  based  on 
the  inverse  of  the  share  of profits  in consumption,  which  is  'model-free,' 
in  the  sense  that  it could  be  used  regardless  of  one's  stand  on  product 
creation.  Furthermore,  we  identify  an  endogeneity  bias  in  the  identifi 
cation  of what  the  literature  commonly  labels  cost-push  shocks  (see,  e.g., 
Clarida,  Gali,  and  Gertler  1999):  in  the  presence  of  endogenous  variety, 
the Phillips  curve  features  an  extra  term  that  depends  on  the number  of 
available  varieties.  This  term would  be  attributed  to cost-push  shocks  by 
a  researcher  using  a markup  proxy  that  does  not  account  for  variety 
when  estimating  the Phillips  curve.  Finally,  it has  been  pointed  out  that 
one  of  the main  drawbacks  of  the  forward-looking  New  Keynesian 
Phillips  curve  is  its  failure  to generate  endogenous  inflation  persistence 
(e.g.,  Fuhrer  and Moore  1995). We  show  that  our  version  of  the  Phillips 
curve  can  potentially  alleviate  this  problem,  because  the number  of  va 
rieties  featured  in  the  Phillips  curve  is a  state  variable,  and  hence  it  in 
duces  extra  persistence  in  inflation. 
Numerical  examples  show  that  the  responses  to aggregate  productiv 
ity and  deregulation  shocks  under  simple,  but  plausible  specifications  of 
interest  rate  setting  are  close  to  the  flexible-price  responses.  Exogenous 
interest  rate  cuts  induce  the  economy  to  expand  but  reduce  entry,  be 
cause  the  associated  increase  in real wages  increases  the  cost  of  firm  cre 
ation  and  the  expected  return  from  investing  in new  products  falls. With 
productivity  shocks  as  the  source  of  fluctuations  and  an  empirically 
plausible,  simple  rule  for  interest  rate  setting  involving  interest  rate 
smoothing  and  a  response  to  expected  producer  price  inflation,  the 
cyclical  properties  of  endogenous  variables  are very  close  to  those  of  the 
flexible-price  counterpart  and,  in  turn,  to  those  of  the  benchmark  RBC 
model,  as  documented  by  BGM.  In  contrast  to  the  flexible-price  model 
with  translog  preferences  studied  in BGM,  sticky  prices  with  CES  pref 
erences  yield  too much  markup  countercyclicality  and  a counterfactual 
time  profile  of  this  cyclicality.  This  happens  because  the markup  is no 
longer  tied  to  the  number  of  producers  (as  in BGM)  with  translog  pref 
erences.  On  the  bright  side,  aggregate  profits  remain  procyclical  (con 
sistent  with  stylized  facts)  even  in  the presence  of  a very  countercyclical 
markup,  and  the model  remains  able  to  explain  the  procyclicality  of 
business  creation. 
Producer  entry  and  product  creation  pose  an  interesting  question  for 304  Bilbiie,  Ghironi,  and Melitz 
the modeling  of  nominal  rigidity.  When  a new  entrant  makes  its  first 
price-setting  decision,  we  must  take  a stand  on whether  it operates  as  all 
preexisting  producers  do,  subject  to  the  same  nominal  rigidity?thus 
preserving  the  symmetry  across  producers  that  is  a  feature  of  the 
Rotemberg  (1982) model?or  whether  it sets  its price  in flexible  fashion, 
but  aware  that  it  will  face  a  cost  of  adjusting  its price  in all  subsequent 
periods.  We  begin  our  analysis  by  assuming  that  new  entrants  inherit 
the  same  price  rigidity  as preexisting  firms.  This  considerably  simplifies 
the model  and  allows  us  to obtain  an  initial  set  of  analytical  and  numer 
ical  results.  We  then  turn  to  the model  in  which  new  entrants  set  prices 
in flexible  fashion,  but  knowing  that  they will  be  subject  to a cost  of price 
adjustment  from  the  following  period  on.13  In this  case,  nominal  rigidity 
results  in heterogeneity  in price  levels  across  cohorts  of  producers  that 
entered  the  economy  at  different  points  in  time,  and  the  aggregate  de 
gree  of  nominal  rigidity  is endogenous:  expansions  are  associated  with 
lower  aggregate  rigidity  because  the number  of new  entrants  whose  de 
cision  is not  influenced  by  past  price  setting  increases.  We  show  that  the 
log-linear  version  of  this  extended  model  can  still  be  solved  in  tractable 
fashion,  and  we  explore  the  consequences  of  endogeneity  in  aggregate 
rigidity  by  means  of  numerical  examples.  Plausible  parameter  values 
imply  responses  to  shocks  that  are  virtually  indistinguishable  from 
those  of  the  benchmark  model.  Since  we  assume  that  average  product 
turnover  is  realistically  small  at  quarterly  frequency,  small  changes  in 
the  fraction  of  firms  that  set prices  in  more  flexible  fashion  triggered  by 
shocks  have  negligible  aggregate  consequences,  and  the  benchmark 
model  in which  new  entrants  inherit  the  same  price  adjustment  cost  as 
incumbents  yields  robust  conclusions. 
As  in BGM,  we  explore  the  consequences  of  non-CES  preferences  by 
replacing  the  familiar  Dixit-Stiglitz  (1977)  variety  aggregator  with  a gen 
eral  homothetic  specification  of  symmetric  preferences?parametrized 
in  translog  form  for model  solution  purposes.  This  implies  that  the  elas 
ticity  of  substitution  across  products  increases  with  the  number  of 
producers,  introducing  an  additional  effect  of  the  number  of  available 
goods  on  inflation  in  the New  Keynesian  Phillips  curve.  In our  numeri 
cal  examples,  this  extension  yields  conclusions  that  are  similar  to  those 
of  the benchmark  model,  although  it further  improves  the performance 
of  the model  on  the  inflation  persistence  front. 
Lewis  (2006)  and  Elkhoury  and Mancini  Griffoli  (2006)  develop  mod 
els with  nominal  rigidity  that  are  closest  to  the  one  studied  here.  Lewis 
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miliar  Calvo-Yun  (1983,1996,  respectively)  fashion  into  the BGM model. 
She  documents  VAR  evidence  that monetary  policy  expansions  result  in 
increased  firm  entry  by  boosting  aggregate  demand,  and  she  shows  that 
the  sticky-wage  model  reproduces  this  evidence.  Elkhoury  and Mancini 
Griffoli  assume  that  entry  costs  in  the BGM  model  take  the  form  of  fees 
paid  to  lawyers  with  monopoly  power.  Under  nominal  rigidity,  the 
lawyers  set  the  entry  fees  in Calvo-Yun  fashion  and,  as  in Lewis,  a  mon 
etary  expansion  that  boosts  the  economy  results  in  increased  firm  entry. 
Monetary  policy  expansions  boost  firm  entry  in  these  models  because 
they  induce  the  real  cost  of product  creation  to  fall.14 Bergin  and  Corsetti 
(2005)  document  VAR  evidence  on  the  consequences  of  exogenous 
changes  in monetary  policy  for  entry  similar  to  that  in Lewis'  paper. 
They  set up  a  model  with  entry  and  one-period  price  rigidity  that  repli 
cates  this  evidence,  and  they  characterize  optimal  monetary  policy  and 
the  properties  of  shock  transmission.  In Bergin  and  Corsetti's  model, 
monetary  expansions  induce  increased  firm  entry  by  increasing  dis 
counted  expected  future  profits.  We  show  that  a version  of  our model  in 
which  entry  requires  purchases  of materials  rather  than  hiring  labor 
generates  increased  entry  in  response  to  monetary  policy  shocks  by  re 
moving  the  tight  connection  between  marginal  production  cost  and  the 
value  of  the  firm  embedded  in  the  benchmark  setup.  Berentsen  and 
Waller  (2007)  contribute  to  this  literature  on monetary  policy  with  firm 
entry  by  introducing  endogenous-seller  entry  subject  to  an  entry  fee  in 
Lagos  and Wright's  (2005) model,  in  which  informational  frictions  moti 
vate  the  existence  of money  as  a medium  of  exchange.  Price  posting  in 
advance  of  entry  constitutes  a  price  rigidity  similar  to  Bergin  and 
Corsetti's  model.  They  show  that  the  Friedman  rule  (zero  nominal  in 
terest  rate)  is optimal  in  their model  with  fixed  entry  costs.  But  depar 
tures  from  the  Friedman  rule  are  optimal  when  congestion  effects  cause 
entry  costs  to  increase  with  the number  of  firms. 
The  rest  of  the  paper  is organized  as  follows.  Section  2 presents  our 
benchmark  model.  Section  3  obtains  the  results  on  optimal  monetary 
policy  in  the  benchmark  setup.  Section  4  discusses  the  implications  of 
endogenous  entry  and  product  variety  for  the New  Keynesian  Phillips 
curve.  Section  5  studies  monetary  policy  through  interest  rate  setting  in 
our  model.  Section  6  illustrates  the  business  cycle  properties  of  the 
model.  Section  7 discusses  the main  results  of  the  extensions  we  explore: 
the  assumption  that  entry  requires  materials  rather  than  labor,  the  alter 
native  assumptions  on  initial  price  setting  by  new  entrants,  and  non 
CES  preferences.  Section  8 concludes. 306  Bilbiie,  Ghironi,  and Melitz 
2  The Model 
2.1  Household  Preferences  and  the 
Intratemporal  Consumption  Choice 
We  consider  a cashless  economy,  as  in  Woodford  (2003).  The  economy  is 
populated  by  a unit  mass  of  atomistic,  identical  households.  The  rep 
resentative  household  supplies  Lt hours  of work  in  each  period  Hna 
competitive  labor market  for  the  nominal  wage  rate Wt  and maximizes 
expected  intertemporal  utility  Et[Z  =tPS_'U(CS, Ls)], where  Ct  is consump 
tion  and  p e  (0,1)  the  subjective  discount  factor.  The  period  utility  func 
tion  takes  the  form  U(Ct,  Lt) 
=  In Ct 
- 
x(L,)1+1/V(1  +  l/<p),  X >  0, where 
9  >  0  is  the  Frisch  elasticity  of  labor  supply  to wages,  and  the  intertem 
poral  elasticity  of  substitution  in  labor  supply. 
At  time  t,  the  household  consumes  the  basket  of  goods  Ct,  defined 
over  a continuum  of  goods  ft:  Ct 
= 
[ JweftcXw)e-1/etMe/(e_1)/ where  6 >  1 is 
the  symmetric  elasticity  of  substitution  across  goods.  At  any  given  time 
t, only  a  subset  of  goods  ft,  c  ft  is available.  Let  pf(co) denote  the  nomi 
nal  price  of  a good  co e  ftr  The  consumption-based  price  index  for  the 
home  economy  is  then  Pt 
= 
[Jwea^co)1_edco]1/(1~e) 
and  the household's  de 
mand  for  each  individual  good  co is c,(co) 
= 
[/?f(co)/PJ~eCr 
2.2  Firms 
There  is a  continuum  of monopolistically  competitive  firms,  each  pro 
ducing  a different  variety  co  e ft.  Production  requires  only  one  factor,  la 
bor.  Aggregate  labor  productivity  is indexed  by  Zt, which  represents  the 
effectiveness  of  one  unit  of  labor.  Productivity  is exogenous  and  follows 
an AR(1)  process  in percent  deviation  from  its steady-state  level.  Output 
supplied  by  firm  co is y,(co) 
= 
Z,Z,(co), where  Z,(co) is  the  firm's  labor  de 
mand  for productive  purposes.  The  unit  cost  of  production,  in units  of 
the  consumption  good  Ct,  is wt/Zt,  where  wt 
= 
Wt  /Pt  is  the  real wage. 
Prior  to entry,  firms  face  a  sunk  entry  cost  of fE  t  effective  labor  units, 
equal  to wJE  t  /Zt  units  of  the  consumption  good.  There  are no  fixed  pro 
duction  costs.  Hence,  all  firms  that  enter  the  economy  produce  in every 
period,  until  they  are hit with  a  "death"  shock,  which  occurs  with  prob 
ability  8 g  (0,1)  in every  period.  We  assume  that  the  entry  cost/Et  is ex 
ogenous  and  treat  changes  in/?t  as  changes  in  market  regulation. 
Firms  face  nominal  rigidity  in  the  form  of  a quadratic  cost  of  adjust 
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of  the  composite  basket)  of  output-price  inflation  volatility  around  a 
steady-state  level  of  inflation  equal  to 0  facing  firm  co is: 
k [  p,(a>)  j2pt(co)  ^n 
w(tt)afe  jTyf(tt)' 
This  expression  is  interpreted  as  the  amount  of marketing  materials  that 
the  firm must  purchase  when  implementing  a price  change.  We  assume 
that  this  basket  has  the  same  composition  as  the  consumption  basket. 
The  cost  of  adjusting  prices  is proportional  to  the  real  revenue  from  out 
put  sales,  [pt(u)/Pt]y?(<&),  where  yf(co)  is  firm  co's  output  demand. 
Firms  face  demand  for  their  output  from  consumers  and  from  firms 
themselves  when  they  change  prices.  In each  period,  there  is a mass  Nt 
of  firms  producing  and  setting  prices  in  the  economy.  When  a new  firm 
sets  the  price  of  its  output  for  the  first  time,  we  appeal  to  symmetry 
across  firms  and  interpret  the  t-l  price  in the  expression  of  the price  ad 
justment  cost  for  that  firm  as  the notional  price  that  the  firm would  have 
set  at  time  t -  1  if  it had  been  producing  in  that  period.  An  intuition  for 
this  simplifying  assumption  is  that  all  firms  (even  those  that  are  setting 
the  price  for  the  first  time)  must  buy  the  bundle  of  goods  pact(u>)  when 
implementing  a price  decision.15  It should  be  noted,  however,  that  this 
assumption  is  entirely  consistent  both  with  the  original  Rotemberg 
(1982)  setup  and  with  our  timing  assumption  that  follows.  Specifically, 
new  entrants  behave  as  the  (constant  number  of)  price-setters  do  in 
Rotemberg's  framework,  where  an  initial  condition  for  the  individual 
price  is dictated  by  nature.  In our  framework,  new  entrants  at  any  time 
t  who  start  producing  and  setting  prices  at  t +  1 are  subject  to precisely 
the  same  assumption  as  price  setters  in Rotemberg's  original  setup. 
Moreover,  the  assumption  that  a new  entrant,  at  the  time  of  its first price 
setting  decision,  knows  the  average  product  price  last  period  is consis 
tent with  the  timing  assumption  that  an  entrant  starts  producing  only 
one  period  after  entry,  hence  being  able  to  learn  the  average  product 
price  during  the  entry  period.16 
The  total  demand  for  the  output  of  firm  co is  thus 
[pt(io)~\-e 
yf(co)-  Zy-  (Ct  + PACt), 
*-t 
where  PACt 
= 
Ntpact(o>),  and we  used  symmetry  across  firms  in  the def 
inition  of  the  aggregate  demand  of  the  consumption  basket  for price  ad 
justment  purposes  PACt. 
Let  p,(co) 
= 
pt(ixX)/Pt denote  the  real  price  of  firm  co's  output.  Then,  firm 308  Bilbiie,  Ghironi,  and Melitz 
co's real  profit  in period  t (distributed  to households  as  dividend)  can  be 
written  as 




-  -  -  1  pf(co)y?(co). 
z\_Pt-i\<?)  J 
The  real  value  of  the  firm  at  time  t (in units  of  consumption)  is  the  ex 
pected  present  discounted  value  of  future  profits  from  t +  1 on,  dis 




E, ?  A,,sds(co), (1) 
s=t+l 




8)]S_'17C(CS, Ls)/Uc(Ct,  Lt)  is  the  discount  factor  ap 
plied  by  households  to  future  profits  from  firm  co (which  faces  a proba 
bility  8 of  being  hit with  the  "death"  shock  in each  period). 
At  time  t, firm  co  chooses  Z,(co)  and  p,(co)  to  maximize  d,(co) +  i?f(co)  sub 
ject  to y,(co) 
= 
yf^co),  taking  wt,  Pt,Ct,  PACt,  and  Zt  as  given.  Letting  X^00) 
denote  the Lagrange  multiplier  on  the  constraint  yt(u>) 
= 
yf(co),  the  first 
order  condition  with  respect  to  Zf(co)  yields: 
,  ,  wt 
A 
The  shadow  value  of  an  extra  unit  of  output  is  simply  the  firm's  mar 
ginal  cost,  common  across  all  firms  in  the  economy. 
The  first-order  condition  with  respect  to pf(co) yields: 
P,M 
= 
vMPM  ). 
Firm  co sets  the  price  as  a markup  [|x,(co)] over  nominal  marginal  cost, 
where  the markup  |jLf(to)  is given  by 
M-,(w)  =-f-F?TT-TT-' 
P,-i(a>) IP,^(<?)  _\ 
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As  expected,  the markup  reduces  to  6/(6  -1)  in  the  absence  of  nominal 
rigidity  (k 
= 
0)  or  if the price  pf(co)  is constant. 
Firm  Entry  and Exit 
In  every  period,  there  is  an  unbounded  mass  of  prospective  entrants. 
These  entrants  are  forward  looking,  and  correctly  anticipate  their  future 
expected  profits  d,(co)  in  every  period  as well  as  the  probability  8  (in 
every  period)  of  incurring  the  exit-inducing  shock.  We  assume  that  en 
trants  at  time  t only  start  producing  at  time  t +  1, which  introduces  a 
one-period  time-to-build  lag  in  the model.  The  exogenous  exit  shock  oc 
curs  at  the  very  end  of  the  time  period  (after  production  and  entry).  A 
proportion  8 of  new  entrants  will  therefore  never  produce.  Prospective 
entrants  in period  t compute  their  expected  post-entry  value  given  by 
the  present  discounted  value  of  their  expected  stream  of  profits  vt(<u>). 
This  also  represents  the  average  value  of  incumbent  firms  after produc 
tion  has  occurred  (since  both  new  entrants  and  incumbents  then  face  the 
same  probability  1 -  8 of  survival  and  production  in  the  subsequent  pe 
riod).  Entry  occurs  until  firm  value  is equalized  with  the  entry  cost,  lead 
ing  to  the  free  entry  condition  vt(u>) 
= 
wJ^/Z,.  This  condition  holds  so 
long  as  the mass  NEt  of  entrants  is positive.  We  assume  that macroeco 
nomic  shocks  are  small  enough  for  this  condition  to hold  in  every  pe 
riod.17  Finally,  the  timing  of  entry  and  production  we  have  assumed  im 
plies  that  the number  of  producing  firms  during  period  t is given  by Nt 
= 
(1-8)(NW  + 
NE/M). 
Symmetric  Firm  Equilibrium 
In equilibrium,  all  firms make  identical  choices.  Hence,  X,(co) 
= 










yt,  pact(u) 
= 
pact,  d,(a>) 
= 
dt, 
and  vt((o) 
= 
vt. The  aggregate  output  of  the  consumption  basket  (used  for 
consumption  and  to pay  price  adjustment  costs)  is 
Yf 
= 





The  expression  of  the price  index  Pt  implies  that  the  relative  price  p, and 






Let  i:t denote  inflation  in producer  prices:  irt 
= 
ptlpt_x -1.  Then,  we  can 
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+  ir'+lK+1 
This  can  be  simplified  further  by  noting  that PACt 
= 





K(irf)2/2]Yf,  to obtain: 
_e_ 
f  *  1  f  [ 1  -  (k/2)(it,)2  Nt IT.  (2) 
(e -1)  i - 




m  i  (JnZ L  (i +  vXi 
Log-linearization  of  this  equation  delivers  our model's  New  Keynesian 
Phillips  curve,  incorporating  the  effect  of  endogenous  product  variety, 
which  we  discuss  in detail  in section  4. 
2.3  Household  Budget  Constraint,  Saving,  and  Labor  Supply 
Households  hold  two  types  of  assets:  shares  in a mutual  fund  of  firms 
and  bonds.  Let  xt be  the  share  in  the mutual  fund  of  firms  held  by  the 
representative  household  entering  period  t. The  mutual  fund  pays  a  to 
tal profit  in each  period  (in units  of  currency)  that  is equal  to  the  total 
profit  of  all  firms  that produce  in that period,  PtNtdt.  During  period  t, the 
representative  household  buys  xt+1  shares  in a  mutual  fund  of NHt 
= 
Nt 
+  NEtt  firms  (those  already  operating  at  time  t and  the  new  entrants). 




S)NHt  firms will  produce  and  pay  dividends  at  time  t + 
1. Since  the household  does  not  know  which  firms  will  be  hit  by  the  ex 
ogenous  exit  shock  8 at  the  very  end  of  period  t,  it finances  the  continu 
ing  operation  of  all preexisting  firms  and  all new  entrants  during  period 
t.  The  date  t  price  of  a claim  to  the  future  profit  stream  of  the mutual  fund 
of NH  t firms  is  equal  to  the  average  nominal  price  of  claims  to  future 
profits  of  home  firms,  Vt 
= 
Ptvr 
The  household  enters  period  t  with  nominal  bond  holdings  BNt  and 
mutual  fund  share  holdings  xt.  It receives  gross  interest  income  on  bond 
holdings,  dividend  income  on  mutual  fund  share  holdings  and  the 
value  of  selling  its  initial  share  position,  and  labor  income.  The  house 
hold  allocates  these  resources  between  purchases  of bonds  and  shares  to 
be  carried  into  next  period  and  consumption.  The  period  budget  con 
straint  (in units  of  currency)  is: 
*Wi 
+  VtNH,xt+1 




+  (Df +  Vt)Ntxt 
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where  it_x  denotes  the  nominal  interest  rate  on  holdings  of  bonds  be 
tween  t-l  and  t,  Dt  denotes  nominal  dividends  (Dt 
= 
Ptdt),  i\  is a  labor 
subsidy  whose  role we  discuss  in  the  following,  and  T\  is a  lump-sum 
tax  satisfying  the  constraint  TLt 
? 
-t[Wt  Lt  in equilibrium.  Dividing  both 
sides  by  Pt and  denoting  holdings  of bonds  in units  of  consumption  with 
Bt+1 
- 
BN,t  + l/Pt'  We  Can  Wrlte 
Zt+1 + 
vtNHAxt+1 
+  C, 
= 
(1 +  rt)Bt +  (dt +  vt)Ntxt  +  (1 + ^)wtLt  +  t\,  (3) 
where  1 +  rt is  the  gross,  consumption-based,  real  interest  rate  on  hold 
ings  of bonds  between  t  -1  and  t, defined  by  1 +  rt 
= 
(1 4-  it_^)/(l  +  irf), 
with  irf 
= 
Pt/Pt_x -1,  and  t\ 
= 
T\/Pt.  The  home  household  maximizes  its 
expected  intertemporal  utility  subject  to  this  budget  constraint. 





and*,  = 3(1  - 
8)E, 
("^J 
V,+1 + dM) . 
As  expected,  forward  iteration  of  the  equation  for  share  holdings  and 
absence  of  speculative  bubbles  yield  the  asset  price  solution  in  equa 
tion  (l).18 
The  first-order  condition  for  the optimal  choice  of  labor  effort  requires 
that  the marginal  disutility  of  labor  be  equal  to  the marginal  utility  from 





2.4  Aggregate  Accounting  and  Equilibrium 
Aggregating  the budget  constraint  (3) across  households  and  imposing 
the  equilibrium  conditions  Bt+1 
= 
Bt 




1, Vf,  yields  the 
aggregate  accounting  identity  Yt 
= 
Ct  +  NEtvt 
= 
wtLt  + Ntdt,  where  we 
defined  GDP,  Yt: Consumption  plus  investment  (in new  firms)  must  be 
equal  to  income  (labor  income  plus  dividend  income). 
Labor  market  equilibrium  requires  Ntlt  +  NEtfEt/Zt 
= 
Lt: The  total 
amount  of  labor  used  in production  and  to  set  up  the  new  entrants' 
plants  must  equal  aggregate  labor  supply.  (Of  course,  this  condition  is 312  Bilbiie,  Ghironi,  and Melitz 
redundant  once  equilibrium  in  goods  and  asset  markets  is  imposed.) 
The  equilibrium  conditions  of  our  benchmark  model  are  summarized  in 
table  5.1. 
The  model  is closed  by  specifying  a  rule  for nominal  interest  rate  set 
ting  by  the monetary  authority,  the  setting  of  the  labor  subsidy  iLt, and 
processes  for  the  exogenous  entry  cost/E,  and  productivity  Zt. 
3  Price  Stability  with  Endogenous  Entry  and  Product  Variety 
The  flexible-price  analysis  of BGM  leaves  inflation  in consumer  and  pro 
ducer  prices?respectively,  Pt and  pt?indeterminate  because  monetary 
policy  has  no  real  effect  in  the  flexible-price,  cashless  economy,  and we 
need  not  concern  ourselves  with  the paths  of nominal  variables  in order 
to  solve  for  real  ones.  When  prices  are  sticky,  this  is no  longer  the  case. 
Specifically,  given  a change  in  the number  of  producers  Nt  and  the  asso 
ciated  movement  in  the  relative  price  pt  implied  by  the  variety  effect 




(N,)176-1,  the  allocation  of  this  relative  price  move 
ment  to changes  in producer  or  consumer  prices  is  important  for  the dy 
namics  of  real  variables  and  welfare.  In  turn,  producer  price  inflation  is 
a determinant  of  firm  entry?and  thus Nt?via  its  impact  on  firm  prof 
its. This  section  studies  optimal  monetary  policy  in our model  and  the 
optimal  allocation  of variety  effects  to producer  versus  consumer  prices. 
Our  analysis  of  optimal  monetary  policy  builds  on  results  in Bilbiie, 
Ghironi,  and Melitz  (2006). We  show  there  that  the flexible-price  version 
of  the  economy  described  previously  is efficient?the  competitive  equi 
librium  coincides  with  the  social  planner's  optimum?if  labor  supply  is 
inelastic  (cp 
= 
0)  and  Lt 
=  1 Vr.  The  reason  is  that, with  CES  Dixit-Stiglitz 
preferences,  the  profit  destruction  externality  generated  by  producer 
entry  (which  reduces  demand  for  each  individual  firm)  is  exactly 
matched  by  the  consumer's  love  for  variety?both  determined  by  the 
elasticity  of  substitution  6. The  flexible-price  economy  is  inefficient  if 9 
>  0 because  there  is a  misalignment  of markups  across  the  items  the  con 
sumer  cares  about  (consumption,  priced  at  a markup  over  marginal 
cost,  and  leisure,  priced  competitively),  but  efficiency  is  restored  if  the 
labor  subsidy  iLt is equal  to  the net markup  of pricing  over  marginal  cost, 
1 /  (6 -1)  in all periods.  This  subsidy  aligns  markups  across  consumption 
goods  and  leisure  while  preserving  the  expected  profitability  of  firm  en 




1) yt  below. 
Sticky  prices  imply  a time-varying  markup  whenever  producer  prices Table 
5.1 
Benchmark  Model,  Summary 
_  .  .  w. 
Pricing  Pt  =  V>t-y 
_e_ 
Markup  ^ f  k  1  f  \~Ct  N.  Yf+1  IT 
F  (0-1)  1  --(nf  +  KJ(1  +  7it)7it-P(l  -8)Ej  q^^^1  +  wt+iK+i  J 
Variety  effect  p,  =  (N,)1^ 
Ik  1 
Yc 
Profits  d=  1-(O2  ? 
'  L ^  2V  ?  ]Nt 
Free  entry  vt  =  wt  ? 
Number  of  firms  Nt  =  (1  -  8)(NM  + NE/M) 
if. 
Intratemporal  optimality  xW1/(p  =  (1  +  T9? 
Euler  equation  (shares) 
z>, 
=  |3(1  -  8)  Et  I  -^-  J  V,+1  +  d,+1) 
Euler  equation  (bonds)  (Q)"1  =  $Et  -~-  (Q^)"1 
[  K  r1 
Output  of 
consumption 
sector  Yf  =  1-(7it)2  Ct 
Aggregate  accounting  Ct  +  NE  tvt  =  wtEt  +  N,df 
CPI  inflation  1?A  =  A_ 
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are  changing  over  time.  As  shown  in Bilbiie,  Ghironi,  and Melitz  (2006), 
markup  nonsynchronization  across  periods  (as  well  as  across  states  and 
arguments  of  the  utility  function)  generates  inefficiency  compared  to 
the  planner's  optimum.  Since  in  this  particular  model  time  variation  of 
the markup  in  the  competitive  equilibrium  is due  to producer  price  in 
flation,  we  expect  a zero  rate  of  inflation  in producer  prices  to be  the  op 
timal  monetary  policy  chosen  by  a planner.  The  following  proposition 
confirms  that  this  is  indeed  the  case.  To  isolate  our main  result,  we  prove 
the proposition  for  the  case  of  inelastic  labor  and  then  briefly  discuss  the 
elastic  labor  case.  As  in BGM  (2006), we  assume  that  the planner  chooses 
the  amount  of  labor  that  is  allocated  to  producing  existing  varieties, 
which,  in  turn,  determines  the  number  of  produced  varieties.  In addi 
tion,  in  this  paper,  the planner  also  chooses  the  rate  of producer  price  in 
flation. 
Proposition  1  The  optimal  rate of producer  price  inflation  irt, chosen  by a so 
cial planner,  is zero. 
The  proof  of  Proposition  1  is  in an  appendix,  available  on  request.  The 
intuition  is straightforward:  producer  price  inflation  acts  as  a  tax on  firm 
profits  in our model,  as  can  be  seen  directly  in  the  corresponding  equa 
tion  in  table  5.1  (inflation  erodes  the  share  of  total  profits  in  consump 
tion  output  both  directly  and  by  its  impact  on markups).  It distorts  firm 
entry  decisions  and  the  allocation  of  labor  to  creation  of  new  firms 
versus  production  of  existing  goods,  resulting  in  suboptimal  consump 
tion  and  lower  welfare.  Optimal  policy,  therefore,  aims  to  stabilize  pro 
ducer  price  inflation  at  zero.  Importantly,  however,  while  producer 
prices  must  be  stabilized,  the  optimal  rate  of  consumer  price  inflation 
must  move  freely  to accommodate  changes  in  the number  of  varieties: 
where  a star  denotes  variables  in  the  efficient  equilibrium.  Given  the  ev 
idence  of bias  in the measurement  of CPI  inflation  (precisely  due  to poor 
accounting  for new  varieties),  convincingly  documented  by  Broda  and 
Weinstein  (2006),  we  view  this  normative  implication  of  our model  as 
good  news.  The  central  bank  should  target  inflation  in producer  prices 
rather  than  (mismeasured)  CPI  inflation. 
When  labor  supply  is elastic,  the  subsidy  t[ 
=  1 /(0  -1)  ensures  that  the 
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present  between  the marginal  rates  of  substitution  and  transformation 
between  consumption  and  leisure.  In  this  case,  price  stickiness  distorts 
both  the  total  amount  of  labor  supplied  and  its allocation  to  creation  of 
new  firms  and  production  of  existing  goods.  It is easy  to verify  that  a zero 
rate  of  inflation  in producer  prices  is still  the  optimal  monetary  policy. 
The  optimality  of  producer  price  stability  with  inelastic  labor  supply 
highlights  a new  argument  for price  stability  (at  the producer  level)  im 
plied  by  endogenous  entry  and  product  variety.  In a  model  with  exoge 
nously  fixed  number  of  firms  and  inelastic  labor  supply,  time  variation 
in  the markup  would  have  no  impact  on  the  equilibrium  path  of  con 
sumption  and  welfare:  consumption  would  be  simply  determined  by 
the  exogenous  productivity  and  labor  supply  regardless  of markup  dy 
namics.  Endogenous  entry  and  product  variety  imply  that markup  vari 
ation  reduces  welfare  by  distorting  entry  decisions  and  the  allocation  of 
the  fixed  amount  of  labor  to  firm  creation  versus  production  of  existing 
goods.  This  introduces  a  role  for monetary  policy  in  welfare  maximiza 
tion  by  stabilizing  producer  price  inflation  at  zero?and  the markup  at 
its flexible-price  level. We  discuss  implementation  of  the  optimal  mone 
tary  policy  by  setting  the nominal  interest  rate  in  the  following. 
4  The  New  Keynesian  Phillips  Curve  and  the  Log-Linear  Model 
This  section  describes  the  implications  of  endogenous  entry  and  prod 
uct  variety  for  the New  Keynesian  Phillips  curve  and  presents  the  key 
log-linear  equations  of  the model. 
4.1  The New  Keynesian  Phillips  Curve 
To  study  the propagation  of  shocks  and  compute  second  moments  of  the 
endogenous  variables  implied  by  assumptions  on  the  processes  for  ex 
ogenous  shocks,  we  log-linearize  the model  around  the  efficient  steady 
state  with  zero  inflation  under  assumptions  of  log-normality  and  ho 
moskedasticity.  We  denote  percent  deviations  from  steady  state  with 
sans  serif  fonts.  Our  model's  version  of  the New  Keynesian  Phillips 
curve  follows  from  log-linearizing  equation  (2): 
TT,=  (3(1 
" 
8)E/JT,+1-[Lt,  (4)  K 
where  irt and  |x,  now  denote  percent  deviations  from  steady  state  (of 
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ptZt/wt,  it follows  that  |x, 
= 





(With  a  constant  number  of  firms,  this  relation  reduces  to  the  familiar 
negative  relation  between  markup  and marginal  cost  of  the benchmark 





8)E/ir,+1  + ?? 
(w, -Zt)--Nr  (6) 
K  K 
Equation  (6)  is  a New  Keynesian  Phillips  curve  relation  that  ties  firm 
level  inflation  dynamics  to  marginal  cost  in a  standard  fashion.  Impor 
tantly,  the  effect  of marginal  cost  is adjusted  to reflect  the number  of pro 
ducers  that  operate  in  the  economy.  This  is  a  predetermined,  state 
variable,  which  introduces  directly  a degree  of  endogenous  persistence 
in  the  dynamics  of product  price  inflation  in  the Phillips  curve. 
Furthermore,  our model  links  the dynamics  of  inflation  to asset  prices 
in  an  endogenous  way,  as  can  be  seen  by  combining  (6) with  the  log 









-N(.  (7) 
K  K 
This  equation  ties  inflation  dynamics  to  the  relative  price  of  investment 
in new  firms.  It stipulates  that,  for given  expected  inflation  and  number 
of  firms,  inflation  is positively  related  to equity  prices.  Together  with  the 
no-arbitrage  condition  between  bonds  and  equity  implied  by  optimal 
household  behavior,  this  connection  between  inflation  and  equity  prices 
(and  thus  capital  accumulation  in our model)  plays  a crucial  role  for  the 
determinacy  and  stability  properties  of  interest  rate  setting  that we  dis 
cuss  in  the  following. 
Finally,  using  the  definition  of  CPI  inflation,  we  can write  the New 
Keynesian  Phillips  curve  for  consumption-based  inflation: 
< 
=  p(l 
- 


















where  irf now  denotes  the  percent  deviation  of  the  gross  CPI  inflation 
rate  from  the  steady  state.  Consumption-based  inflation  displays  an  ad 
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in  that  it depends  directly  on  the number  of  firms  that  produced  at  time 
t-l,  which  was  determined  in period  t -  2. 
Implications  for  Empirical  Exercises 
Existing  empirical  studies  estimating  the  New  Keynesian  Phillips 
curve  (4),  such  as  Sbordone  (2002)  and  Gali  and  Gertler  (1999),  proxy 
the  (unobservable)  markup  variable  with  the  inverse  of  the  labor  share. 
This  is  an  approximation  that  holds  exactly  in  a model  without  en 
dogenous  variety.  In our model  with  endogenous  variety,  however,  this 
relationship  no  longer  holds.  Indeed,  if one  believes  product  variety  to 
be  important  for  business  cycles,  the  proxy  for  the markup  that  one 
should  use  is  the  inverse  of  the  share  of  labor  (in  consumption  output) 
beyond  the  overhead  quantity  (from  an  aggregate  perspective)  used  to 




LEt)].  This  markup  measure 
corresponds  closely  to  the  labor  share measure  used  by  Rotemberg  and 
Woodford  (1999)  that  takes  into  account  overhead  labor.  Log 
linearization  of  this  equation,  when  replaced  into  (4), delivers  a relation 
that  is empirically  testable.19  Alternatively,  exploiting  the  equation  for 




Df/Yf)-1,  as  a proxy  for markups,  where  Df 
= 
dtNt  +  k/2  (^t)2Yf 
are  profits  gross  of  the  costs  of  price  adjustment.  Note  that  since  these 
costs  are  zero when  log-linearizing  around  a zero-inflation  steady-state 
(and  hence  consumption  is  equal  to  consumption  output  and  gross 
profits  are  equal  to net  profits),  the  empirically  usable  equation  will  fea 
ture  only  observable  variables,  that  is, consumption  and  total  profit  re 
ceipts  (or dividends).20 
A  further  implication  of  our  framework  for empirical  exercises  comes 
from  the  natural  distinction  between  consumer  and  producer  price  in 
flation  in our model:  our  framework  implies  that,  in order  to overcome 
measurement  issues  inherent  in using  CPI  inflation,  empirical  studies  of 
the Phillips  curve  should  concentrate  on  producer  price  inflation  (which 
is also  the  relevant  objective  for monetary  policy).  Construction  of CPI 
data  by  statistical  agencies  does  not  adjust  for  availability  of  new  vari 
eties  in  the  specific  functional  form  dictated  by  the welfare-consistent 
price  index.  Furthermore,  adjustment  for variety,  when  it happens,  cer 
tainly  does  not  happen  at  the  frequency  represented  by  periods  in our 
model.  Actual  CPI  data  are  closer  to  pt  (the  average  price  level  in our 
economy)  than  Pt.  For  this  reason,  when  investigating  the  properties  of 
the model  in  relation  to  the  data  (for  instance,  when  computing  second 
moments  below  or  in  the  specification  of  policy  rules  that  allow  for  re 318  Bilbiie,  Ghironi,  and Melitz 
action  to measured  real  quantities),  one  should  focus  on  real  variables 
deflated  by  a data-consistent  price  index.  For  any  variable  Xt  in units  of 
the  consumption  basket,  such  data-consistent  counterpart  is obtained  as 
Related  to  this measurement  issue,  our  framework  implies  an  endo 
geneity  bias  in  cost-push  shocks  in much  of  the  empirical  literature  on 
the New  Keynesian  Phillips  curve.  An  endogenous  term  that  depends 
on Nt  (due  to  the measurement  bias  from  not  accounting  for variety)  is 
attributed  to  exogenous  cost-push  shocks  when  estimating  the  Phillips 
curve  equation  (6) using  a proxy  for marginal  cost without  variety. 
When  the variety  effect  is removed  from  the welfare-consistent  equity 






8)E/irf+1  + 
-^?(Vk,, 
" 
U,  (9) 
where  vRt is the value  of  the  firm/price  of  shares  net  of  the variety  effect. 
For  given  expectations  of  future  inflation,  actual  inflation  is  increasing 
in  the  data-consistent  price  of  equity. 
4.2  The  Log-Linear  Model 
The  log-linear  model  can be  reduced  to  the  following  equations  (plus  the 
New  Keynesian  Phillips  curve  [4]): 
N,+1 
= 
(1 +  r +  i|*)N, 
- 







+  [(r +  8 +  v|i)(9 
- 
1) +  8]Z, 
- 
8f?>t, (10) 
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where  we  defined  \\i 
= 
cp[(r  +  8)(0 
- 
1) +  8]/(0 
- 
1), which  is zero  when 
labor  supply  is  inelastic.  The  model  is closed  by  specifying  the  conduct 
of monetary  policy  (via  the  setting  of  the nominal  interest  rate  i,)  over  the 
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5  Monetary  Policy  over  the  Business  Cycle 
In  this  section,  we  discuss  determinacy  and  stability  properties  of 
simple  rules  for nominal  interest  rate  setting  over  the business  cycle  and 
the  implementation  of  the  optimal  policy  of  producer  price  stability. 
5.1  Simple  Policy  Rules 
For  illustrative  purposes,  we  consider  the  following  class  of  simple  in 
flation-targeting  rules  for  interest  rate  setting: 
i^^U  +  TE.TT^ +  TcE^  +  g;,  1>T^0,T>0,TC^0,S 
= 
0,1.  (13) 
where  ? j  is an  exogenous  shock  capturing  the nonsystematic  component 
of monetary  policy.  We  assume  that  tc 
=  0  when  t >  0 and  vice  versa,  re 
stricting  the  central  bank  to  reacting  to  either  producer  or  consumer 
price  inflation.22  For  the  reasons  we  have  previously  discussed,  a  re 
sponse  to welfare-based  CPI  inflation  is suboptimal  (and  not  feasible  in 
reality  due  to  the measurement  problems  we  mentioned).  In  consider 
ing  this  scenario,  we  abstract  from  normative  prescriptions  and  mea 
surement  issues;  rather,  we  ask  the  question:  what  would  the  response 
of  the  economy  to various  shocks  be  if  the  central  bank  could  monitor 
movements  in welfare-consistent  CPI  inflation  and  followed  a  rule  in 
volving  the  latter? 
Determinacy  and  Stability 
In  this  section,  we  study  the determinacy  and  stability  properties  of  our 
model  under  different  monetary  policy  rules.  To  analyze  local  determi 
nacy  and  stability  of  the  rational  expectation  equilibrium,  we  can  focus 
on  the  perfect  foresight,  no-fundamental-shock  version  of  the  system 
formed  by  (4),  (10),  (11),  and  the  equation  obtained  by  substituting  the 
monetary  policy  rule  (13)  into  the  Euler  equation  for bonds  (12). To  be 
gin  with,  consider  the  simple  rule  in  which  the  central  bank  is respond 
ing  to expected  producer  price  inflation  with  no  smoothing:  \t 
= 
TEtirt+1. 
The  following  proposition  establishes  that  the Taylor  Principle  holds  in 
our model  economy  for  all plausible  combinations  of parameter  values. 
Proposition  2  Lety 




b)]. Assume  that  cp 
= 
0, and  (3,8, 
and  6 are such  that  1 -7(6  -1)  >  0,  (3  >  1/2,  6 >  2,  andi  <  7 =  (k +  6 - 
1)/(Q 
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As  for  Proposition  1,  the  proof  of  Proposition  2  is  in  the  appendix, 
available  on  request.  We  remark  that  the  parameter  restrictions  in 
Proposition  2  are  sufficient  conditions  for  the  Taylor  Principle  to hold, 
and  they  are  extremely  weak.  For  instance,  the values  of  k and  0 that we 
consider  (k 
=  77  and  0 3.8)  imply  t  =  28.5:  the  sufficient  condition  t < 
28.5  is  satisfied  by  any  realistic  parametrization  of  interest  rate  setting. 
Moreover,  while  we  cannot  prove  it analytically,  we  verify  numerically 
that  determinacy  and  stability  hold  for values  of  t well  above  the  thresh 
old  t  for  the parameter  values  we  consider. 
Validity  of  the Taylor  Principle  is an  important  result  given  the debate 
on  the  Taylor  Principle  in  models  with  physical  capital  accumulations. 
Dupor  (2001)  shows  that  passive  interest  rate  setting  (t <  1)  is necessary 
and  sufficient  for  local  determinacy  and  stability  in  a  continuous-time 
model  with  physical  capital.  Carlstrom  and  Fuerst  (2005)  study  the  issue 
in a discrete-time  model  with  capital  and  conclude  that  it  is essentially 
impossible  to  achieve  determinacy  with  forward-looking  interest  rate 
setting.  Our  result  shows  that  the  standard  Taylor  Principle  is  restored 
when  capital  accumulation  takes  the  form  of  the  endogenous  creation  of 
new  production  lines. 
Intuition:  The Role  of  Asset  Prices  in  Monetary  Policy  Transmission 
Since  the validity  of  the Taylor  Principle  in our  setup  is  in  striking  con 
trast  to  results  of models  with  traditional  physical  capital,  an  intuitive 
explanation  of  this  difference  is  in order.  Indeed,  the mechanism  for  this 
result  in our model  is centered  precisely  on  the  role  of  the  endogenous 
price  of  equity?the  value  of  the  firm?in  our  New  Keynesian  model 
with  free  entry.  As  we  anticipated,  the  explanation  relies  on  one  hand  on 
the  Phillips  curve  in  (9)  that  relates  inflation  and  asset  prices  (net  of  the 
variety  effect)  vR t  and  on  the  other  hand  on  the  no-arbitrage  condition 
implied  by  the Euler  equations  for bonds  and  shares.  This  condition  can 
be written  as: 












Focus  first  on  the policy  rule  studied  in Proposition  2, where  the  rele 
vant  inflation  objective  is expected  product  price  inflation,  and  consider 
the  following  experiment.  Suppose  that  a  sunspot  shock  unrelated  to 
any  fundamental  hits  the  economy,  and  that  (without  losing  generality) 
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are  taken  as  given.  We  wish  to show  that  if the policy  rule  is passive  (the 
Taylor  Principle  is violated),  this  sunspot  shock  will  have  real  effects, 
whereas  if  the  policy  rule  is active  the  sunspot  has  no  effect.  When  the 
Taylor  Principle  is violated,  an  increase  in expected  inflation  triggers  a 
fall  in  the  real  interest  rate.  From  the no-arbitrage  condition  (14),  this  im 
plies  that  the  data-consistent  price  of  shares  must  rise  (a fall  in  the  real 
return  on  bonds  must  be matched  by  a  fall  in  the  real  return  on  shares, 
which,  for  fixed  expected  dividend  and  future  price,  means  an  increase 
in  the  share  price  today).  But  an  increase  in  the  share  price  implies,  by 
(9),  that  actual  inflation  today  will  rise,  and  hence  that  the  sunspot  is self 
fulfilling.  When  the Taylor  Principle  is  satisfied,  the  opposite  holds:  the 
sunspot  triggers  an  increase  in  the  real  interest  rate,  a  fall  in  today's 
share  price  by  no-arbitrage,  and  a  fall  in  today's  inflation  by  the Phillips 
curve,  making  the  sunspot  vanish.23 
The  same mechanism  can be  easily  verified  to hold  for a policy  rule  re 
sponding  to  contemporaneous  producer  price  inflation,  and  indeed  to 
(contemporaneous  or  expected)  inflation  in consumer  prices.  Therefore, 
we  omit  the  formal  statements  and  proofs  of  the  Taylor  Principle  for 
those  cases,  to  save 
space.24 
A  comparison  of  our  results  and  intuition  with  those  of Carlstrom  and 
Fuerst  (2005)  allows  us  to  further  emphasize  the  crucial  role  of  the  dif 
ferent  type  of  capital  at  the  core  of  our  model.  Carlstrom  and  Fuerst 
show  that  indeterminacy  occurs  in a discrete-time  model  with  physical 
capital  when  the  central  bank  responds  to expected  future  inflation  be 
cause  the no-arbitrage  condition  between  bonds  and  capital  contains  no 
variable  dated  at  time  t. This  happens  because  the  expected  return  to 
capital  depends  only  on  future  variables  determining  the marginal 
product  of  capital  at  time  t +  1.  In  turn,  this  implies  that  there  is a zero 
root  in  the  system,  and  indeterminacy.25  Instead,  in our model,  the  ex 
pected  return  on  shares  depends  on  the  price  of  shares  today  (an  en 
dogenous  variable),  hence  removing  this  zero-root  problem.  Indeed, 
through  today's  price  of  equity,  our  model  provides  a novel  link  be 
tween  the no-arbitrage  condition  and  the Phillips  curve  that  is absent  in 
models  that  do  not  feature  endogenous  variety  and  free  entry. 
5.2  Implementing  Price  Stability  with 
Endogenous  Entry  and  Product  Variety 
The  efficient,  flexible-price  equilibrium  requires  the  nominal  interest 
rate  to be  equal  to  the  Wicksellian  interest  rate  (in  Woodford's  2003  ter 322  Bilbiie,  Ghironi,  and Melitz 
minology),  that  is  the  interest  rate  if  that  prevails  when  prices  are  flex 
ible  and  producer  price  inflation  is zero.  In  log-linear  terms,  the Wick 
sellian  interest  rate  is: 
1 
i*  =  EC*  -  C*  -_(N*  -N*^  =  FC*  -  C*  4- ttc* 
where  EtC*+1 
-  C*  is  the  risk-free,  real  interest  rate  of  BGM  and  nf  *a is 
the  optimal  consumer  price  inflation  that  accommodates  changes  in va 
riety  between  t and  t +  1  (known  at  time  t).  Note,  however,  that  com 
mitment  to  the policy  rule  \t 
= 
\f  would  result  in equilibrium  indetermi 
nacy,  as  in  the  standard  model  with  a  fixed  number  of  producers 
discussed  in Woodford  (2003),  because  nominal  interest  rate  setting 
would  contain  no  feedback  to  variables  that  are  endogenous  in  the 
sticky-price  equilibrium. 
A  simple  interest  rate  rule  that  implements  the  efficient,  flexible-price 
equilibrium  is 
f, 
= 
TIT,  + 
EfY?(  + 1 
- 
%,  T>1,  (15) 
where  it 
= 
\t 
-  i  * is the  interest  rate  gap  relative  to  the what  is interest  rate, 


















C*f  is  the 
gap  between  measured  consumption  output  and  its  flexible-price  level. 
The  interest  rate  rule  (15)  requires  the monetary  authority  to  track 
changes  in  the Wicksellian  interest  rate  and  in expected  growth  of  the 
consumption  output  gap,  and  to  respond  more  than  proportionally  to 
inflation.  It is possible  to verify  that  the  following  equation  holds  for  the 
dynamics  of  the  consumption  output  gap: 
Substituting  the  interest  rate  rule  (15)  into  this  equation  yields  tit, 
= 
EtiTt+1,  which  has  unique  solution  irt 
=  0 Vf,  since  the Taylor  Principle  is 
satisfied.  In  turn,  zero  producer  price  inflation  in all periods  implies  YRt 
= 
0,  and  therefore,  i, 
= 
ifVr.26 
6  Business  Cycles:  Propagation  and  Second  Moments 
In  this  section,  we  explore  the  properties  of  our  benchmark  model  by 
means  of  numerical  examples.  We  compute  impulse  responses  to pro 
ductivity,  deregulation,  and monetary  policy  shocks.  Next,  we  compute 
second  moments  of  our  artificial  economy  and  compare  them  to  second 
moments  in  the  data  and  those  produced  by  the  baseline  BGM  model 
with  flexible  prices  and  CES  preferences.  As  shown  in BGM,  these  mo Monetary  Policy  with  Endogenous  Entry & Product  Variety  323 
ments  (which  also  correspond  to  those  under  the optimal  monetary  pol 
icy  in  the  sticky-price  economy)  are  very  close  to  those  generated  by  the 
standard  RBC  model. 
6.1  Calibration 
In our  baseline  calibration,  we  interpret  periods  as  quarters  and  set  (3 
= 
0.99?a  standard  choice  for quarterly  business  cycle  models.  We  set  the 
size  of  the  exogenous  firm  exit  shock  8 =  0.025  to  match  the U.S.  empir 
ical  level  of  10 percent  job destruction  per  year.27 We  use  the  value  of  6 
from  Bernard,  Eaton,  Jensen,  and  Kortum  (2003)  and  set  6 = 
3.8, which 
was  calibrated  to  fit U.S.  plant  and macro  trade  data.28 We  set  initial  pro 
ductivity  to Z  =  1. The  initial  steady-state  entry  cost/?  does  not  affect 
any  impulse  response;  we  therefore  set/? 
=  1  without  loss  of  generality. 
We  consider  different  values  for  the  elasticity  of  labor  supply,  cp,  and we 
set  the weight  of  the  disutility  of  labor  in  the  period  utility  function,  X/ 
so  that  the  steady-state  level  of  labor  effort  is  1?and  steady-state  levels 
of  all  variables  are  the  same?regardless  of  cp.29  We  set  the  price  sticki 
ness  parameter  k = 
77,  the value  estimated  by  Ireland  (2001).  Although 
Ireland  obtained  this  estimate  using  a  different  model,  without  entry 
and  endogenous  variety,  our  results  are  not  sensitive  to  changes  in  the 
value  of  this  parameter  within  a plausible  range. 
6.2  Impulse  Responses 
Productivity 
Figure  5.1  shows  the  responses  (percent  deviations  from  steady  state)  to 
a  1 percent  increase  in productivity  for  the  inelastic  labor  case.  For  con 
sistence  with  the  second-moment  results  in  the  following,  we  assume 
productivity  persistence  0.979,  as  in King  and  Rebelo  (1999).  The  figure 
compares  the  efficient  flexible-price  equilibrium  obtained  under  opti 
mal  monetary  policy  (round  markers)  with  three  alternative  parame 
trizations  of  the monetary  policy  rule  (13).  The  first  is a  simple  rule  re 
sponding  to  expected  producer  price  inflation,  it 
= 
1.5Et7Tt+1  (cross 
markers);  the  second  is  a  rule  involving  interest  rate  smoothing,  \t 
= 
0.81^  +  03Et7Tt+1  (square  markers),  which  features  the  same  long-run  re 
sponse  to expected  inflation  (1.5)  as  the previous  rule;  and  the  third  is a 
rule  responding  to  expected  welfare-consistent  CPI  inflation,  i, 
= 
1.5E/nf+1  (star markers).  Note  that  the  difference  between  the  responses 
under  each  of  the  simple  rules  and  the  optimal  policy  measures  the  gap 324  Bilbiie,  Ghironi,  and Melitz 
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Figure  5.1 
Impulse  responses:  productivity  shock,  persistence  .979. Round  markers:  optimal  policy. 
Cross  markers:  i, 
=  1.5  Etnt+r  Square  markets:  i, 
= 
.8i,_L  +  .3E/irf+1.  Star  markers:  i, 
=  1.5 
relative  to  the flexible-price  equilibrium  under  the  alternative  rules.  The 
number  of  years  after  the  shock  is on  the horizontal  axis,  and  responses 
are  normalized  so  that  0.3  (for  instance)  denotes  0.3  percent. 
Focus  on  the  responses  under  the  optimal  policy.  The  increase  in pro 
ductivity  makes  the business  environment  temporarily  more  attractive, 
drawing  a higher  number  of  entrants  (NEt), which  translates  into  a grad 
ual  increase  in  the number  of  producers  (Nt) before  entry  and  the  stock 
of production  lines  return  to  the  steady  state.  The  larger  number  of  pro 
ducers  induces  the marginal  cost  (wt/Zt 
-  not  shown)  and  the  relative 
price  of  each  product  pt to  increase  gradually  with  unchanged  markup. 
The  GDP  (Yt) and  consumption  (Q)  increase,  and  so does  investment  in 
new  firms  (vf 
= 
vtNEtt) 
as  the  fixed  labor  supply  is  reallocated  toward 
creation  of  new  products.  Interestingly,  firm-level  output  (yt)  is below 
the  steady  state  during  most  of  the  transition,  except  for  an  initial  ex 
pansion.  The  effect  of  a higher  relative  price  prevails  on  the  expansion 
in  consumption  demand  to  push  individual  firm  output  below  the Monetary  Policy  with  Endogenous  Entry & Product  Variety  325 
steady  state  for much  of  the  transition,  with  expansion  in  the number  of 
producers  and  investment  in new  firms  responsible  for GDP  remaining 
above  the  steady  state  throughout  the  transition.  Notably,  the  dynamics 
of  firm  entry  result  in  responses  that  persist  beyond  the  duration  of  the 
exogenous  shock,  and,  for  some  key  variables,  display  a hump-shaped 
pattern.30 
When  comparing  responses  across  policy  rules,  a  remarkable  feature 
of  the  results  is  that  the  dynamics  of macroeconomic  aggregates  under 
the  first  two  simple  policy  rules  are  strikingly  similar  to  those  in  the flex 
ible-price  equilibrium.  Indeed,  the  responses  of GDP  are  virtually  indis 
tinguishable,  and  those  of  consumption  and  the number  of producers  are 
also  very  close.  Equivalently,  the  changes  in producer  price  inflation  and 
the markup  induced  by  technology  shocks  under  these  policy  rules  are 
small.  It is  worth  stressing  that  this  is in contrast  to responses  in the  fixed 
variety,  benchmark  New  Keynesian  model,  where  there  are  quantita 
tively  significant  deviations  from  the  flexible-price  equilibrium  under 
such  simple  policy  rules.  In our model,  instead,  a simple  rule  such  as  \t 
= 
1.5Et7it+1, despite  not  featuring  an overly  aggressive  response  to  inflation, 
manages  to bring  the  economy  quite  close  to  its  first-best  optimum.  This 
is no  longer  true when  monetary  policy  responds  to welfare-consistent 
CPI  inflation:  there  are more  evident  differences  in  the  responses  of  con 
sumption  and  the number  of  producers,  stemming  from  the  suboptimal 
response  of  the  central  bank  to  movements  in  welfare-based  CPI  inflation 
that  reflect  fluctuations  in  the number  of products.31 
Importantly,  our model  with  entry  can  induce  inflation  and  counter 
cyclical  markups,  and  potentially  procyclical  labor,  in response  to  tech 
nology  shocks.  To  understand  this  result,  recall  the  intuition  in  the  stan 
dard  New  Keynesian  model,  which  implies  deflation  and  procyclical 
markups  in  response  to  productivity  increases:  marginal  cost  falls, 
prices  decrease  (there  is deflation),  but  not  by  as much  because  of  stick 
iness,  so  output  increases  and  markups  increase,  too?that  is,  the 
markup  is procyclical.  In our model  with  entry,  there  is  an  additional 
channel  of  shock  transmission  working  in  the  opposite  direction:  posi 
tive  productivity  shocks  increase  future  profits  and  the value  of  the  firm 
(it  is  more  productive  to  create  new  goods).  Entry  puts  pressure  on  la 
bor  demand,  inducing  marginal  cost  to  increase  in order  to  satisfy  free 
entry.  By  this  channel,  prices  increase,  but  not  by  as much,  and  output 
increases  (both  consumption  and  investment  increase).  There  is  infla 
tion  and  the markup  is  countercyclical.  Otherwise  put,  through  the 
usual  channel,  labor  demand  by  existing  firms  falls,  the  real wage  falls, 326  Bilbiie,  Ghironi,  and Melitz 
and  the markup  increases.  Through  the new  channel,  labor  demand  by 
entrants  increases  and,  if  it  increases  enough,  it can  overturn  the  usual 
effect  and  generate  an  increase  in  total  labor  demand,  a  higher  real 
wage,  and  a  countercyclical  markup.  Which  channel  dominates  de 
pends  on  parameter  values  (for  instance,  shock  persistence).  As  shown 
in  figure  5.1,  the new  channel  dominates  on  impact  with  the persistence 
that we  use  to compute  second  moments  in  the  following  discussion. 
Deregulation 
Figure  5.2  shows  the  responses  to a  1 percent,  permanent  deregulation 
shock  (a lowering  of  the  entry  cost/?,)  with  inelastic  labor  supply  under 
the  same  policy  scenarios  discussed  earlier. 
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Impulse  responses:  permanent  deregulation.  Round  markers:  optimal  policy;  Cross 
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Focus  again  on  responses  under  the  optimal  policy.  Deregulation  at 
tracts  new  entrants  and  firm  value  decreases  (the  relative  price  of  the  in 
vestment  good  falls).  Since  investment  is relatively  more  attractive  than 
consumption,  there  is  intersectoral  labor  reallocation  from  the  latter  to 
the  former.  Consumption  initially  falls,  as  households  now  postpone 
consumption  to  invest  more  in  firms  whose  productivity  has  not  in 
creased.  The  number  of  firms  starts  increasing,  but  GDP  initially  falls  as 
the  decline  in  consumption  dominates  the  increase  in  investment.  All 
variables  then move  monotonically  toward  their  new  steady-state  lev 
els. A  consequence  of CES  preferences  is  that  the  long-run  expansion  of 
consumption  is entirely  driven  by  the  extensive  margin  (the  long-run  in 
crease  in  the number  of producers),  with  output  per  firm  back  at  the  ini 
tial  steady-state  level. 
As  in  the  case  of  a productivity  shock,  the  responses  for  the  first  two 
alternative  policy  rules,  where  the  targeted  measure  of  inflation  is pro 
ducer  price  inflation,  are  again  very  similar  to  the  flexible-price  re 
sponses.  As  for productivity,  the difference  is  larger when  the monetary 
authority  responds  to  welfare-based  CPI  inflation,  for  the  same  reasons 
discussed  previously.  The  most  notable  difference  with  respect  to  the 
flexible-price  case  in all  responses  (but more  so when  the  rule  responds 
to welfare-based  CPI  inflation)  concerns  the  dynamics  of  the  consumer 
price  index.  Under  the  optimal  policy,  deregulation  induces  deflation  in 
the welfare-based  CPI  (at a decreasing  rate  in absolute  terms)  precisely 
because  there  is an  increase  in  the  number  of  products  (at a decreasing 
rate).  Under  the  alternative  rules,  this  response  changes  sign?positive 
inflation  in  the welfare-based  CPI  occurs?because  the  increase  in pro 
ducer  price  inflation  is high  enough  to  compensate  the  effect  of  the  in 
crease  in  the number  of  available  varieties.  This  effect  is strongest  when 
the  central  bank  responds  to welfare-based  CPI  inflation. 
Monetary  Policy 
The  next  set  of  responses,  plotted  in  figure  5.3,  shows  the  effects  of  a 
purely  transitory  shock  to  the  nominal  interest  rate?a  1 percent  de 
crease  with  zero  exogenous  persistence.  Because  of  the  assumption  of 
zero  exogenous  persistence,  all  responses  are  plotted  for  the policy  rule 
involving  interest  rate  smoothing  (otherwise,  the  effect  of  the  shock  is 
very  short  lived),  but  for different  values  of  the  labor  supply  elasticity,  cp 
= 
0,  2,  and  4,  respectively.32  An  interest  rate  cut  generates  inflation  and 
a  positive  response  of  GDP  (as measured  both  by  Yt  and  the  data 328  Bilbiie,  Ghironi,  and Melitz 
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Figure  5.3 
Impulse  responses:  interest  rate  shock,  persistence  0. Round  markers:  inelastic  labor. 
Cross  markers:  labor  supply  elasticity 
=  2.  Square  markers:  labor  supply  elasticity 
=  4. 
consistent  counterpart,  YRt). Wages  rise,  consistent  with  conventional 
wisdom  and  the  bulk  of  empirical  evidence  for  the  post-1980  United 
States  (for  instance,  Christiano,  Eichenbaum,  and  Evans  1999).  How 
ever,  the  expansionary  effect  on GDP  is combined  with  a contractionary 
impact  effect  on  entry  (and  a  gradual  decrease  in  the  number  of  pro 
ducers)  that  conflicts  with  the  evidence  in Bergin  and  Corsetti  (2005)  and 
Lewis  (2006).33  The  fall  in  the  number  of  entrants  occurs  because  no 
arbitrage  requires  the  expected  return  on  equity  to  fall  along  with  the  ex 
ante  real  return  on  bonds.  The  decrease  in  the  expected  return  on  equity 
is brought  about  by  an  increase  in the price  of  shares  today  relative  to the 
future:  the  procyclical  impact  response  of  the  real wage  translates  into 
an  increase  in  today's  equity  price  via  the  free-entry  condition.  The  cost 
of  firm  creation?which  requires  labor?increases,  and  its expected  re 
turn  falls,  inducing  investment  in new  products  to  fall  (the  combination 
of  prices  that  the household  faces makes  it relatively  more  attractive  to Monetary  Policy  with  Endogenous  Entry & Product  Variety  329 
consume  rather  than  invest).  This  effect  changes  sign  after  a  few  years, 
when  the  real wage  falls  and  share  prices  are  below  the  steady  state, 
making  it attractive  to  invest  in product  creation.  The  contractionary  ef 
fect  of monetary  expansions  on  entry  relies  crucially  on  the  link between 
firm  value  and marginal  cost  implied  by  free  entry.  In section  7,  we  study 
a version  of  the model  that breaks  this  link  and  implies  an  expansionary 
effect  of monetary  policy  expansions  on  firm  entry.34 
6.3  Second  Moments 
To  further  evaluate  the properties  of  the  sticky-price  model,  we  compute 
the  implied  unconditional  second  moments  of  our  artificial  economy  for 
some  key  macroeconomic  variables  and  compare  them  to  those  of  the 
data  and  those  produced  by  the  BGM  flexible-price  model  with  CES 
preferences.  In  this  exercise,  we  focus  on  random  shocks  to Zt  as  the 
source  of business  cycle  fluctuations,  assuming  that  sunk  entry  costs  are 
constant  at fEt 
=  1  and  abstracting  from  exogenous  monetary  policy 
shocks.35  To  start with,  we  compute  moments  of GDP,  consumption,  in 
vestment,  and  hours  worked.  We  use  the  same  productivity  process  as 
King  and  Rebelo  (1999), with  persistence  0.979  and  a standard  deviation 
of  innovations  equal  to  0.0072,  to  facilitate  comparison  of  results  with 
the  baseline  RBC  setup  and  BGM.  As  in King  and  Rebelo's  benchmark 
calibration,  we  set  cp 
=  2.36  Under  sticky  prices,  we  assume  that mone 
tary policy  follows  the  rule  \t 
= 
0.8it_a 4- 03Etirt+1.  This  rule  is empirically 
plausible,  based  on  the  findings  of  a  large  empirical  literature,  which 
documents  the  importance  of  interest  rate  smoothing  in Federal  Reserve 
policy,  its  focus  on  inflation  targeting  since  the  1980s,  and  the marginal 
significance  of GDP  responses.  Table  5.2  presents  the  results.  For  each 
moment,  the  first  number  (bold  font)  is  the  empirical  moment  implied 
by  the U.S.  data  reported  in King  and  Rebelo  (1999),  the  second  number 
(normal  font)  is  the moment  generated  by  the  flexible-price  model  (or 
optimal  monetary  policy  under  sticky  prices),  and  the  third  number 
Table  5.2 
Moments  for Data,  BGM  CES  Model,  and  Sticky  Prices 
Variable  Xt  axt  <jxt/aYRt  E(XtKt_1)  corr(Xt,YRt) 
YRt  1.81  1.34  2.36  1.00  0.84  0.70  0.70  1.00 
CR/t 1.35  0.65  0.66  0.74  0.48  0.48  0.80  0.75  0.74  0.88  0.97  0.98 
Investment,  vRtNEt  5.30  5.23  5.20  2.93  3.90  3.82  0.87  0.69  0.69  0.80  0.99  0.99 
Lt 1.79  0.63  0.63  0.99  0.47  0.46  0.88  0.69  0.69  0.88  0.98  0.98 
Source  for  data  moments:  King  and  Rebelo  (1999). 330  Bilbiie,  Ghironi,  and Melitz 
(italics)  is  the moment  generated  by  the  sticky-price  model  under  the 
rule  discussed  previously.  We  compute  model-implied  second  mo 
ments  for HP-filtered  variables  for  consistency  with  data  and  standard 
RBC  practice,  and  we  measure  investment  in our  model  with  the  real 
value  of household  investment  in new  firms  (vRtNEt). 
The  performance  of  the  sticky-price  model  is virtually  indistinguish 
able  from  that  of  the  flexible-price  economy,  which?in  turn?is  re 
markably  close  to  that  of  a benchmark  RBC model  in reproducing  some 
key  features  of U.S.  business  cycles  as  documented  in BGM.  The  simi 
larity  in performance  across  sticky-  and  flexible-price  models  is not  sur 
prising  in  light  of  the  similarity  of  impulse  responses  between  the  rule 
we  are  considering  and  the  optimal  policy  that we  discussed  previously. 
An  empirically  plausible  degree  of  nominal  rigidity  does  not  signifi 
cantly  alter  the  performance  of  the model  relative  to  the  flexible-price 
counterpart  once  one  takes  into  account  that  Federal  Reserve  policy  ap 
pears  not  to have  been  too  distant  from  optimal  in  the  recent  past.  Un 
der  a plausible  specification  of monetary  policy,  the baseline  sticky-price 
framework  (as  the  flexible-price  one)  faces  the  same  well-known 
difficulties  of  the  standard  RBC  model:  consumption  and  hours  are  too 
smooth  relative  to output;  there  is not  enough  endogenous  persistence 
(as  indicated  by  the  first-order  autocorrelations);  and  all  real  variables 
are  too  procyclical  relative  to  the  data.  As  far  as  inflation  is concerned, 
the model  produces  a  standard  deviation  of  product  price  inflation 
equal  to 0.01,  autocorrelation  0.82,  and  correlation  with  GDP  -0.87.  The 
effect  of  slow  movement  in  the number  of  producers  contributes  to  the 
persistence  of  inflation,  as previously  explained. 
Figure  5.4  shows  the model-generated  correlation  of  the markup  with 
GDP  at  various  lags  and  leads,  comparing  it  to  that  documented  by 
Rotemberg  and Woodford  (1999)  and  that  generated  by  the BGM  model 
with  translog  preferences.37  The  flexible-price  model  with  translog  pref 
erences  almost  perfectly  reproduces  the  contemporaneous  Counter 
cyclicality  of  the markup;  furthermore,  the  time  profile  of  its correlation 
with  the business  cycle  is very  similar  to that  documented  by  Rotemberg 
and Woodford.  The markup  is countercyclical  with  translog  preferences 
because  the  elasticity  of  substitution  across  goods  is  tied  to  the  number 
of producers,  which  increases  during  expansions.  The  time  profile  of  the 
correlation  is  due  to  the  slow  response  of  the  stock  of  producers  to 
shocks,  with  GDP  increasing  on  impact,  and  the  number  of  producers 
responding  gradually  and with  a  lag.  The  sticky-price  model  with  CES 
preferences  generates  excessive  contemporaneous  Countercyclicality Monetary  Policy  with  Endogenous  Entry & Product  Variety  331 
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The  Cyclicality  of  the Markup  (1). 
and  fails  to  replicate  the  time  profile  of  the  correlation  because  the 
markup?now  determined  by  the  dynamics  of  producer  price  infla 
tion?is  no  longer  tied  to  the number  of  producers.  On  the  bright  side, 
the  sticky-price  model  with  endogenous  entry  and  product  variety  gen 
erates  procyclical  producer  entry,  qualitatively  in  line with  empirical  ev 
idence,  and  procyclical  aggregate  profits:  The  contemporaneous  corre 
lation  between  DRt 
= 
NtdRA  and  YRt  is  0.95.  Even  if  the markup  falls 
during  expansions,  aggregate  profits  increase  due  to  the  expansion  in 
the  number  of  producers.38 
In  sum,  given  plausible  nominal  rigidity  and  policy  behavior  for  in 
flation-sensitive  policymakers,  the  performance  of  the  sticky-price 
model  at  replicating  key  business  cycle moments  is?not  surprisingly? 
close  to  the  flexible-price  counterpart.  The  sticky  price  model  fails  to 
match  the  cyclicality  of  the markup,  though  endogenous  variety  gener 
ates  procyclical  profits.  Interestingly,  and  consistent  with  the  presence 
of  an  endogenous-state  variable  in  the New  Keynesian  Phillips  curve 
(6),  the model  delivers  a persistent  inflation  rate.  This  goes  in  the  direc 
tion  of  ameliorating  the  inability  of  the  standard  setup  to generate  suffi 
cient  persistence,  highlighted  by  Fuhrer  and Moore  (1995). 
7  Extensions 
In  this  section,  we  discuss  the  implications  of  three  extensions  of  the 
benchmark  model  discussed  previously.  First, we  study  a version  of  our 
model  in  which  the  tight  link between  firm  value  and marginal  produc 332  Bilbiie,  Ghironi,  and Melitz 
tion  cost  implied  by  free  entry  is broken  by  assuming  that  entry  requires 
purchasing  units  of  the  consumption  basket  rather  than  hiring  labor. We 
show  that  this  version  of  the model  generates  increased  producer  entry 
in response  to expansionary  monetary  policy  shocks.  Second,  returning 
to  the  benchmark  specification  of  the  entry  cost,  we  remove  the  as 
sumption  that  new  entrants  inherit  the  same  degree  of  price  stickiness 
as  incumbents  and we  allow  new  entrants  to  take  their  first price-setting 
decision  in flexible  fashion.  We  consider  two  alternative  assumptions:  in 
one  case,  new  entrants  set  their  initial  price  flexibly,  but  take  into  ac 
count  that  they will  face  a cost  of  price  adjustment  from  next  period  on. 
In  the  other  case, we  simply  assume  that  new  entrants  charge  a constant 
markup  over  marginal  cost. We  show  that  these  versions  of  the model 
deliver  dynamic  responses  to  shocks  that  are  virtually  identical  to  those 
of  the benchmark  model  for plausible  parameter  values.  Finally,  return 
ing  to  the benchmark  assumption  on  the  cost  of price  adjustment,  we  ex 
plore  the  implications  of  departing  from  CES  preferences,  extending  the 
benchmark  model  to  a  general,  homothetic  specification  of  consump 
tion  preferences.  We  parametrize  this  specification  in  translog  form  and 
show  also  that  this  extension  leaves  the  key  properties  of  the model 
roughly  unchanged. 
7.1  Entry  Cost  in Units  of Consumption 
Our  benchmark  model  generates  reductions  in firm  entry  in response  to 
expansionary  monetary  policy  shocks.  This  is a  consequence  of  the  in 
crease  in  the  entry  cost  evaluated  in units  of  consumption,  wtfEt/Zt,  in 
duced  by  the  shock.  The  countercyclical  impact  response  of  the markup 
in  figure  5.3  is associated  with  a procyclical  response  of  the  real wage. 
This  induces  an  increase  in  the  cost  of hiring  labor  for  firm  creation  and, 
via  the  free-entry  condition,  the  price  of  investment,  thus  discouraging 
entry.  This  result  conflicts  with  empirical  evidence  on  the  response  of 
firm  entry  to monetary  policy  shocks  in Bergin  and  Corsetti  (2005)  and 
Lewis  (2006).  Here,  we  present  a  simple  modification  of  our  benchmark 
model  that  delivers  a positive  response  of  entry  to  reductions  in  the  in 
terest  rate. 
The  modification  consists  of  assuming  that  the  entry  cost/E,,  rather 
than  being  defined  in units  of  effective  labor,  is defined  in units  of  the 
consumption  basket,  Ct:  Instead  of hiring  labor,  entry  now  requires  pur 
chasing  a basket  of materials  in the  amount/"^,  where  this basket  has  ex 
actly  the  same  composition  as  consumption,  and  we  introduce  the  su Monetary  Policy  with  Endogenous  Entry & Product  Variety  333 
perscript  C  to differentiate  the notation  relative  to  the  benchmark  case. 
As  a consequence  of  this modification,  output  of  the  consumption  sector 
now  coincides  with  GDP:  Yt 
= 
Nt  ptyt 
= 
wtLt  +Ntdt,  and  there  is no  longer 
any  sectoral  reallocation  of  labor  between  product  creation  and  produc 
tion  of  existing  goods.  The  new  assumption  implies  the  following 
changes  in  the model  of  table  5.1:  Yt  replaces  Yf  in  the  expressions  for 
markup  and  profits  (it  is no  longer  necessary  to have  an  equation  defin 
ing Yf),  and  the  free-entry  condition  equates  the value  of  the  firm  tofEt. 
In  log-linear  terms,  the New  Keynesian  Phillips  curve  is unaffected. 
The  new  free-entry  condition  implies  that  the  price  of  investment  in 
new  firms  in units  of  consumption  is now  constant  absent  exogenous 
changes  in/-f,  due  to changes  in  market  regulation.  Absent  such  shocks, 
and  normalizing/^  to  1,  the model  reduces  to  one  in which  the  con 
sumption-based  price  of  investment  in  firm  creation  is  constant  and 
equal  to one  unit  of  consumption?exactly  as  in the  standard  RBC  setup 
without  costs  of  capital  adjustment.  Importantly,  this  does  not  imply 
that  the price  of  investment  evaluated  in data-consistent  units,  vRt 
= 
vj 
pt,  or  the  nominal  price  of  investment,  Vt,  are  constant.  But  the  even 
tighter  isomorphism  between  our  entry  model  and  the  familiar  RBC 
framework  in welfare-consistent  units  has  important  implications, 
which  we  now  discuss. 
Abstracting  from  regulation  changes,  setting/^ 
= 
1,  and  imposing 
free  entry,  no-arbitrage  between  bonds  and  shares  now  implies: 
(1 
- 
b)Et[(CM)-\l  +  dt+1)\ 
= 
Et  (Ct+1)-\\+tc  (16) 
In  log-linear  terms,  a  monetary  policy  shock  that  reduces  the  ex  ante  real 
interest  rate  between  t and  t +  1  lowers  expected  profits  for period  t + 
1.  However,  it necessarily  leaves  the  expected  present  discounted  value 
of  profits  over  the  infinite  future  unchanged,  to preserve  the  free-entry 
condition^ 
=  1. 
We  log-linearize  the modified  model  around  the  zero-inflation  steady 
state.  Figure  5.5  presents  the  impulse  responses  of  the  log-linearized 
model  to a zero-persistence  1 percent  decrease  in  the  interest  rate  under 
three  alternative  parametrizations  for  interest  rate  setting:  Round  mark 
ers  denote  the  responses  under  the  rule  it 
= 
0.81^  +  0.3irt  +  ?},  cross 
markers  denote  the  case  \t 
= 
0.81^  +  0.3tt,  +  0.1YR  t  +  ?j, and  square  mark 
ers  denote  the  case  it 
= 
1.5irt  +  0.5YRt +  ?j.  In all  three  cases,  the  central 
bank  is responding  to current  rather  than  expected  inflation.  By  tying  the 
equilibrium  stock market  price  of  investment  in product  creation  to  the 334  Bilbiie,  Ghironi,  and Melitz 
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Figure  5.5 
Impulse  responses:  interest  rate  shock,  persistence  0,  entry  cost  in units  of  consumption. 
Round  markers:  it 
= 
M^  +  . 
3irr  Cross  markers:  it 
= 
.81^  +  3irt  +  TYR,.  Square  mark 
ers:  i, 
= 
1.5tt,  +  .5YRr 
exogenous  entry  cost  and making  the model  behave  exactly  as  the RBC 
framework  in  the  investment  dimension,  the modified  setup  reintro 
duces  the problem  highlighted  by  Carlstrom  and  Fuerst  (2005):  if interest 
rate  setting  responds  only  to expected  inflation,  the no  arbitrage  condi 
tion  (16)  features  only  expected  future  variables,  exposing  the  economy 
to  indeterminacy.39  For  this  reason,  we  restrict  attention  to rules  in  which 
the  central  bank  responds  to  current  inflation,  studying  the  conse 
quences  of  interest  rate  smoothing  and/or  a  response  to data-consistent 
GDP.  The  responses  in  figure  5.5  are  computed  for  the  same  parameter 
values  as  the  responses  above,  focusing  on  the  case  in  which  the  elastic 
ity  of  labor  supply  is  cp 
=  2.  Inspection  of  the  figure  shows  that  the  re Monetary  Policy  with  Endogenous  Entry & Product  Variety  335 
sponses  preserve  several  key  features  of  those  in  figure  5.3:  the  shock 
lowers  the  real  interest  rate  and  has  expansionary  consequences  for  con 
sumption  and  GDP.  The  markup  falls  and  the  real wage  increases.  Im 
portantly,  however,  the  price  of  investment  no  longer  rises.  Even  if firm 
profits  fall,  the  expansion  in consumption  demand  with  unchanged  firm 
value  draws  more  firms  into  the market,  and  the number  of  entrants  in 
creases  under  all policy  rules.40  Labor  effort  expands  because  there  is no 
longer  a contraction  in  the use  of  labor  for  firm  creation,  as  in figure  5.3. 
The  response  of  the number  of  entrants  is very  large  under  the  rule  \t 
= 
0.8i^_1 +  0.3TTt +  ?j, with  an  impact  expansion  in  investment  over  80 
percent  above  the  steady  state?and  a correspondingly  large  expansion 
in GDP.  This  result  is another  consequence  of  reducing  the  investment 
side  of  the model  to  the  standard  RBC  setup:  absent  capital  adjustment 
costs,  it is a  familiar  result  of RBC  models  that  investment  is excessively 
volatile.  When  the  equilibrium  value  of  the  firm  is  tied  to  1, our model 
reproduces  this  result.  Policy,  however,  plays  a  role:  introducing  a  re 
sponse  to GDP  in  interest  rate  setting  dampens  the  volatility  of  invest 
ment  and  GDP,  as highlighted  by  the  responses  under  the  rule  \t 
= 
0.8if_a 
+  0.3tt,  +  0.1 Y^ 
+  1.  Finally,  the volatility  of  investment  and GDP  is fur 
ther  dampened  by  removing  interest  rate  smoothing  thus  reducing  the 
persistence  of  the  interest  rate movement,  as  shown  by  the  responses 
under  the  rule  \t 
= 
1.5irf  +  0.5YR,  +  ?j. 
We  omit  the  responses  to productivity  or  deregulation  shocks  in  this 
scenario  (they  are  available  on  request).  Importantly,  under  the  three 
previously  discussed  policy  rules  and with  cp 
= 
2,  a positive  productiv 
ity  shock  with  persistence  0.979  now  causes  inflation  to  fall  and  the 
markup  to rise  on  impact,  as  in the benchmark  fixed-variety  model.  This 
happens  precisely  because  the  link  between  firm  value  and  marginal 
cost  (which  was  providing  the  extra  channel  generating  the  opposite  re 
sults  in  our  baseline  model)  is  absent  when  entry  requires  purchasing 
materials.  The  markup  moves  in countercyclical  fashion  only  under  the 
policy  rule  i, 
= 
0.8i,_a +  0.3ir,  +  0.1 YRt +  ?j because  YRJails  on  impact  un 
der  this  rule.41 
To  conclude,  assuming  that  the  entry  cost  is  in  the  form  of  purchasing 
materials  rather  than  hiring  labor  brings  the predictions  of  the model  in 
response  to  monetary  policy  shocks  closer  to  the  evidence  in Bergin  and 
Corsetti  (2005)  and  Lewis  (2006),  at  least  qualitatively.  However,  pre 
cisely  the  feature  that  generates  this  result  also  has  some  less  appealing 
implications:  the  link between  monetary  policy  and  inflation  through  eq 
uity  prices  disappears,  undermining  the  determinacy  properties  that 
rely  on  this  link. More  generally,  the  crucial  allocative  role  of movements 336  Bilbiie,  Ghironi,  and Melitz 
in  (welfare-consistent)  firm  value  (the  relative  price  of  investment)  dis 
appears  in  this  variation  of  the model.42  Additionally,  this  version  of  the 
model  introduces  an  important  asymmetry  between  the  investment  sec 
tor  (creating  new  product  varieties)  and  the production  sector  in  terms  of 
the  consequences  of  the  "love  of  variety"  effect  embedded  in  the  defini 
tion  of  the  consumption  basket.  Ceteris  paribus,  an  increase  in variety  in 
creases  productivity  in  the  investment  sector  while  leaving  that  in  the 
production  sector  unchanged.  In the benchmark  model,  any  changes  due 
to  the  variety  effect  did  not  have  such  relative  productivity  implica 
tions.43  If  we  discount  exogenous  monetary  policy  shocks  as  a  source  of 
business  cycles,  these  features  of  the modified  model  lead  us  to prefer  our 
benchmark  specification  as  a  starting  point  for  analysis.44 
7.2  Endogenous  Aggregate  Stickiness  and  Producer  Entry 
So  far,  we  have  assumed  that  new  entrants  are  subject  to  the  same  nom 
inal  rigidity  as  incumbent  firms.  It  is plausible,  however,  that  new  en 
trants  in period  t  will  make  their  first price-setting  decision  in period  t + 
1 without  having  to  pay  a  cost-of-price  adjustment  relative  to  a past 
price-setting  decision  they  did  not  make.  In  this  case,  heterogeneity  in 
price  levels  arises  across  cohorts  of  firms  that  entered  at different  points 
in  time,  as  their  price-level  decisions  will  differ  depending  on  the mar 
ginal  cost  conditions  at  the  time  of  entry,  thus  affecting  price-setting  de 
cisions  in  subsequent  periods.  The  degree  of  aggregate  price  rigidity  in 
the  economy  becomes  endogenous,  as  the  number  of  new  price-setters 
that  face  no  cost  of  adjusting  relative  to a past  price  decision  varies  with 
the business  cycle.45 
We  present  the  extended  model  in  the  appendix  (available  on  re 
quest).46  Prior  to  log-linearization,  the model  features  an  infinite  number 
of  state  variables  (we  assume  that  the  economy  has  existed  since  the  in 
finite  past;  thus,  the  set  of  currently  producing  firms,  Nt,  includes  repre 
sentatives  of  an  infinite  number  of  entrant  cohorts).  However,  we  show 
that  in  log-linear  terms,  the  time-t  price-setting  decisions  of  firms  that 
entered  in period  r  -  2 and  further  in  the past  are  identical.47  This  allows 
us  to  characterize  the  log-linearized  behavior  of  producing  firms  in 
terms  of  the  representative  members  of  only  two  sets  of  firms:  those  that 
are  one  period  old  at  time  t (and  thus  are  taking  their  first  price-setting 
decision,  given  our  assumptions  on  the  timing  of  entry  and  production) 
and  those  who  are  two  or more  periods  old. 
Under  the  assumption  that  new  price-setters  take  into  account  that Monetary  Policy  with  Endogenous  Entry & Product  Variety  337 
they will  be  subject  to a cost  of  adjusting  prices  relative  to  their  previous 
choice  from  their  second  period  of  price  setting  on,  optimal  behavior 
does  not  result  in a  constant  markup  over  marginal  cost  in  the  first  pe 
riod  of  price  setting,  since  new  price-setters  incorporate  the  incentive  to 
smooth  price  movements  between  the  initial  choice  and  the  next  pe 
riod's  price  implied  by  the  expectation  of  future  adjustment  costs.  For 
completeness  of  comparison,  we  also  consider  the  scenario  in  which  we 
assume  that  new  price-setters  simply  charge  the  constant  elasticity 
markup  0/(6-1)  over  marginal  cost. 
Figure  5.6  presents  the  responses  to a  1 percent  productivity  increase 
with  persistence  0.979  for  the  benchmark  model  (round  markers),  the 
model  in  which  new  entrants  do  not  pay  a  cost  of  price  adjustment  but 
take  into  account  optimal  future  costs  (cross markers),  and  the model  in 
which  new  entrants  charge  a  constant  markup  over  marginal  cost 
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Alternative  Assumptions  on  Initial  Price  Setting:  Impulse  Responses  to  a Productivity 
Shock,  Aggregate  Variables.  Round  markers:  Benchmark;  Cross  markers:  Entrants  take 
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(square  markers).  We  keep  the  same  parameter  values  as  in  the previous 
exercises  and we  assume  that  labor  supply  is inelastic.  For  simplicity,  we 
assume  a policy  rule  in  which  the  central  bank  responds  with  coefficient 
1.5  to expected  inflation  in producer  prices  in  the  benchmark  model.  In 
the  alternative  (log-linearized)  models,  there  are  two  producer  price  in 
flation  rates:  one  that measures  the  change  in the  initial  price  set  for  time 
t  by  firms  that  entered  at  t  -1  relative  to  the  initial  choice  at  t  -1  by  those 
that  entered  ait-2,  and  the  other  measuring  inflation  in producer  prices 
by  older  firms.  However,  responding  to producer  prices  in  the  bench 
mark  model  amounts  to  responding  to  the  empirically  consistent  mea 
sure  of  consumer  price  inflation  in  the  context  of  that model  (since  pro 
ducer  price  inflation  is  equal  to welfare-consistent  consumer  price 
inflation  minus  the  product  variety  effect  that  is not  captured  by  avail 
able  CPI  data).  For  this  reason,  we  assume  that  in  the  alternative  mod 
els,  the  central  bank  is responding  with  coefficient  1.5  to  inflation  in an 
average  consumer  price  level  Pt  that  removes  the  pure  product  variety 
effect  from  the welfare-consistent  price  index  Pt: Pt 
= 
(Nt)1/{Q'1}Pt  ,48  Under 
all  scenarios,  the  central  bank  is  thus  responding  to  the  empirically  rel 
evant  measure  of  expected  consumer  price  inflation  in  the  context  of  the 
relevant  model.  Figure  5.6  focuses  on  aggregate  quantities,  the nominal 
and  real  interest  rates,  inflation  in  the welfare  consistent  price  index,  in 
flation  in producer  prices  in  the  benchmark  model,  inflation  in Pt  (de 
noted  tt^)  in  the  alternative  models,  and  the  real wage.  The  responses 
of  nonmodel-specific  variables  are  virtually  identical  across  models.  In 
addition,  the  response  of  tt^  is virtually  identical  to  that  of  irt  in  the 
benchmark  model.  To  explore  the  intuition  for  this  result,  figure  5.7 pres 
ents  the  responses  of  variables  that  are  specific  to  cohorts  of  firms.  For 
all  variables  other  than  firm  values,  variables  indexed  by  a  superscript  1 
refer  to  one-period-old  firms  in  the  alternative  models,  and  variables 
without  superscript  refer  to older  firms  in  the  alternative  models  and  the 
representative  firm  in  the  benchmark  model.49  The  response  of  vt  is  the 
response  of  firm  value  in  the  benchmark  model.  The  response  of  v\  is 
the  response  of  the  value  of  new  entrants  in  the  alternative  models  (the 
asset  price  that determines  the  allocation  of  resources  to creation  of  firms 
versus  production  of  existing  goods).  Although  the  responses  point  to 
heterogeneity  of  behavior  across  new  price-setters  and  incumbents  in 
the  extended  models,  the  behavior  of  the  representative  firm  of  the 
benchmark  model  is  virtually  indistinguishable  from  that  of  incum 
bents  in  the  alternative  models?and  vt  is  essentially  identical  to  v\. 
Given  the  assumption  of  a  small  steady-state  rate  of  product  turnover 
implied  by  8 = 
0.025,  the  virtual  identity  of  behavior  across  the  repre Monetary  Policy  with  Endogenous  Entry & Product  Variety  339 
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Figure  5.7 
Alternative  Assumptions  on  Initial  Price  Setting:  Impulse  Responses  to  a Productivity 
Shock,  Firm-Level  Variables.  Round  markers:  Benchmark;  Cross  markers:  Entrants  take 
future  cost  into  account;  Square  markers:  Entrants  charge  constant  markups. 
sentative  firm  of  the  benchmark  model  and  incumbents  in  the  alterna 
tive  implies  that  small  departures  of  the  number  of  new  entrants  (and 
new  price-setters)  from  the  steady  state  have  negligible  consequences 
for  aggregate  dynamics  relative  to  the benchmark  model. 
The  role  of  8  for  the  differences  across  nominal  rigidity  assumptions 
is best  illustrated  by  the  extreme  example  of  figure  5.8.  There  we  present 
the  responses  of  the  same  variables  as  in  figure  5.6  to  a permanent  de 
crease  in  the  nominal  interest  rate with  the  rate  of  product  destruction 
set  to  the  unrealistically  high  value  of  8 =  0.25.  The  shock  causes  a per 
manent  increase  in  inflation  and  thus  a permanent  drop  in  the number 
of  producers,  and  a permanent  reallocation  of  labor  from  firm  creation 
to production  of  incumbent  goods.  Consistent  with  intuition,  the  real 
consequences  of  the  shock  become  smaller  as we  move  from  the bench 340  Bilbiie,  Ghironi,  and Melitz 
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Alternative  Assumptions  on  Initial  Price  Setting:  Impulse  Responses  to  a Permanent  In 
terest  Rate  Shock.  Round  markers:  Benchmark;  Cross  markers:  Entrants  take  future  cost 
into  account;  Square  markers:  Entrants  charge  constant  markups. 
mark  model  to  the model  in which  new  price-setters  take  into  account 
the  future  cost  of  price  adjustment,  and  from  this  to  the model  in  which 
new  price-setters  charge  a  constant  markup.  This  is  in  line  with  de 
creasing  aggregate  nominal  rigidity  as we  move  from  one  model  to  the 
next.  Nevertheless,  unrealistically  large  average  product  turnover  (and 
extremely  high  shock  persistence)  are  required  in our model  for  any  no 
ticeable  difference  to emerge  in shock  transmission  as  a consequence  of 
more  flexible  price-setting  behavior  by  new  entrants. 
7.5  Non-CES  Preferences 
Having  verified  that  our  benchmark  assumption  on  price  stickiness 
yields  results  that  are  robust  to  alternative  specifications  of  pricing  be Monetary  Policy  with  Endogenous  Entry & Product  Variety  341 
havior  by  new  entrants,  we  return  to  the  benchmark  assumption  on 
pricing,  and we  study  the  consequences  of  extending  the model  in a dif 
ferent  direction?allowing  for non-CES  preferences.  Suppose  the  con 
sumption  basket  takes  a general,  symmetric,  homothetic  form with  elas 
ticity  of  substitution  across  individual  products  6(Nt)  increasing  in  the 
number  of  available  goods  [Q'(Nt) >  0]. This  is  the  assumption  of  BGM. 
A  derivation  mirroring  that  for  CES  preferences  delivers  a markup 
equation  similar  to  (2), with  d(Nt)  replacing  9. The  only  other  equation 
from  table  5.1  that  is  affected  is  the  one  governing  the  variety  effect, 





We  prove  in  the  appendix  (available  on  request)  that  the  (first-best) 
optimal  rate  of producer  price  inflation  remains  zero  under  this  general 
preference  specification.  The  same  policy  rule  (15)  as  in  the  CES  case 
implements  the  optimal  allocation,  when  combined  with  appropriately 
designed  (and  lump-sum  financed)  fiscal  instruments  studied  in detail 
in Bilbiie,  Ghironi,  and  Melitz  (2006).50 We  log-linearize  the markup 
equation  for  this  general  preference  specification  around  the  steady 
state  with  zero  inflation,  and  parametrize  preferences  in  the  translog 
form  introduced  by  Feenstra  (2003)  and  explored  by  BGM  (with  sym 
metric  price  elasticity  of  demand  - 
[1 +  crNJ,  a  >  0). Assuming  the  cal 
ibration  scheme  6  (N) 
=  1 +  crN  = 
6, which  ensures  equality  of  the 
steady  state  across  CES  and  translog  preferences,  we  obtain  the New 
Keynesian  Phillips  curve  for  producer  price  inflation  under  translog 
preferences: 
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Notice  the  difference  from  the  Phillips  curve  with  CES  preferences  (6): 
the  steady-state  benefit  of  additional  variety  is now  half  of  its CES  coun 
terpart,  and  variation  in  the number  of  firms  has  an  independent  effect 
on  the  flexible-price  markup  via  its  effect  on  the  elasticity  of  substitu 
tion,  generating  an  additional  effect  of  the number  of  firms  on  inflation. 
Figure  5.9  shows  the  impulse  responses  to a  1 percent  productivity  in 
crease  with  persistence  0.979  under  CES  (round  markers)  and  translog 
(cross markers)  preferences  for  the benchmark  parameter  values.  We  as 
sume  that  policy  responds  to expected  inflation  in producer  prices  with 
coefficient  1.5. Most  responses  are  qualitatively  similar  across  prefer 
ence  specifications,  although  quantitative  differences  are  noticeable. 
The  most  pronounced  qualitative  differences  are  in  the markup  and 
firm-level  output  responses.  The  markup  is  below  the  steady  state 
throughout  the horizon  of  the  response  under  translog  preferences  due 342  Bilbiie,  Ghironi,  and Melitz 
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Figure  5.9 
CES  versus  Translog:  Impulse  Responses  to  a Productivity  Shock,  Persistence  .979. 
Round  markers:  CES  Cross-markers:  Translog.  Policy:  it 
=  1.5  Etirt+V 
to  the  effect  of  a  larger  number  of  producing  firms  on  the  elasticity  of 
substitution.  At  the  same  time,  the welfare  benefit  of  product  variety  is 
smaller  under  translog  preferences,  and  so  the  response  of  the  number 
of  producers  to  the  shock  is muted  relative  to  the  CES  scenario.  This 
dampens  the  response  of  the  relative  price  and  keeps  firm-level  output 
above  the  steady  state  throughout  the  transition. 
To  verify  whether  translog  preferences  have  noticeable  quantitative 
implications,  we  repeat  the  experiment  of  table  5.2  under  the  translog 
specification.  Table  5.3  replaces  the model-generated  moments  of  table 
5.2 with  the  results  of  the flexible-price  model  with  translog  preferences 
(BGM  translog)  and  its  sticky-price  version.  The  conclusions  are  largely 
unchanged  relative  to  table  5.2,  although?consistent  with  what  we 
noted  previously?translog  preferences  noticeably  increase  the  persist 
ence  of producer  price  inflation:  standard  deviation,  autocorrelation,  and 
correlation  of  irt  with  GDP  are  now  0.02,0.94,  and  -0.61,  respectively. 
Finally,  figure  5.10  augments  figure  5.4  by  including  the model-based Monetary  Policy  with  Endogenous  Entry & Product  Variety  343 
Table  5.3 
Moments  for Data,  BGM  Translog  Model,  and  Sticky  Prices 
Variable  X,  <rXt  <VarRf  E(^A-i)  corr{Xt,  YRt) 
YRt  1.81  1.25  1.29  1.00  0.84  0.70  0.70  1.00 
CRt  1.35  0.75  0.81  0.74  0.60  0.63  0.80  0.78  0.74  0.88  0.95  0.98 
Investment,  vRtNEt  5.30  4.27  4.01  2.93  3.42  3.11  0.87  0.66  0.69  0.80  0.96  0.98 
Et  1.79  0.49  0.49  0.99  0.39  0.38  0.88  0.66  0.68  0.88  0.95  0.97 
Source  for  data  moments:  King  and  Rebelo  (1999). 
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Figure  5.10 
The Cyclicality  of the  Markup  (2) 
markup  cyclicality  in  the  translog  model  with  sticky  prices.  Introducing 
translog  preferences  shifts  the  correlation  between  markup  and  GDP  at 
leads  and  lags  in  the  right  direction  through  the  effect  of variation  in  the 
number  of producers  on  the  elasticity  of  substitution.  However,  the  con 
temporaneous  correlation  becomes  even  more  excessively  negative.  The 
flexible-price  translog  model  remains  the best  (among  those  we  consid 
ered)  at  reproducing  the  cyclicality  of  the markup.51 
8  Conclusions 
This  paper  studied  the  implications  of  introducing  endogenous  product 
creation  in a  sticky-price  model  of  the business  cycle  suitable  for mone 
tary  policy  analysis.  When  variety  is endogenous  and  the  price-setting 
distortion  pertains  to  individual  producer  prices,  first-best  optimal 
monetary  policy  should  aim  at  stabilizing  product  price  inflation  and  let 
the welfare-relevant  consumer  price  index  fluctuate  to  accommodate 
changes  in  the  number  of  products.  Our  model  highlights  a novel  mo 344  Bilbiie,  Ghironi,  and Melitz 
tive  for  price  stability,  which  occurs  because  inflation  acts  as  a distor 
tionary  tax  on  firm  profits,  and  profits  provide  incentives  to  firms  for 
product  creation. 
Our  model  also  identifies  a new  channel  for monetary  policy  trans 
mission  through  the price  of  equity  (the value  of  a  firm  or product).  This 
price  is featured  in  the  inflation-dynamics  equation  in a way  that  is ab 
sent  from  standard  fixed-variety  models,  precisely  due  to  the  connec 
tion  between  the markup  (and marginal  cost)  and  the price  of  equity  via 
the  free-entry  condition.  Moreover,  since  our model  embeds  a portfolio 
decision  between  holding  equity  and  bonds,  monetary  policy  influences 
the price  of  equity  through  a no-arbitrage  condition  that  relates  the  real 
return  on  bonds  (which  the  central  bank  influences)  to  the  expected  real 
return  on  equity.  This  link  between  inflation  dynamics  and  monetary 
policy  through  assets  prices  is central  to  the  validity  of  the Taylor  Prin 
ciple  in our  endogenous-variety  model  with  capital  accumulation  in  the 
form  of  new  production  lines.  This  is unlike  results  from  fixed-variety 
models  with  physical  capital. 
Endogenous  product  variety  has  implications  for  inflation  dynamics 
and  the  estimation  of New  Keynesian  Phillips  curve  equations.  Empiri 
cal  proxies  for  (unobservable)  markups  need  to be  amended  in order  to 
estimate  Phillips 
curves  in  the  presence  of  product  creation.  Moreover, 
we  show  that  the  Phillips  curve  in  the  presence  of  endogenous  variety 
features  an  extra  term  (with  respect  to  its  fixed-variety  counterpart)  that 
depends  on  the number  of  available  varieties,  a  state  variable.  This  goes 
in  the direction  of  alleviating  the notorious  difficulty  of New  Keynesian 
models  in  accounting  for  inflation  persistence  with  forward-looking 
price  setting.  Finally,  we  identify  an  endogeneity  bias  that  is present 
whenever  estimates  of  the  Phillips  curve  ignore  product  variety  and 
hence  attribute  the  endogenous  component  coming  from  its  impact  on 
inflation  dynamics  to exogenous  cost-push  shocks. 
Numerical  exercises  show  that  the  sticky-price  model  performs  simi 
larly  to  the  flexible-price  counterpart  in  terms  of matching  several  fea 
tures  of  the U.S.  business  cycle,  given  a policy  specification  that  is plaus 
ible  for  inflation-sensitive  policymakers.  Consistent  with  the presence  of 
an  endogenous-state  variable  in  the Phillips  curve,  the model  generates 
fairly  persistent  inflation  dynamics.  These  results  are  confirmed  by  two 
extensions  of  the  benchmark  setup:  studying  alternative  assumptions 
for  the  initial  price-setting  decision  by  new  entrants  and  the  conse 
quences  of  non-CES  (specifically,  translog)  preferences.  Another  exten 
sion  studies  a version  of  the model  in  which  entry  requires  purchasing Monetary  Policy  with  Endogenous  Entry & Product  Variety  345 
materials  rather  than  hiring  labor.  In  that model,  the  link  between  firm 
value  and  marginal  production  cost  implied  by  free  entry  disappears: 
monetary  expansions  induce  an  increase  in entry,  but  technology  shocks 
generate  procyclical  markups  and  immediate  deflation  for  a wider 
range  of  parameter  values. 
Recent  empirical  literature  has  documented  the  pervasiveness  of 
product  creation  and  destruction  at a  frequency  that  is relevant  for busi 
ness  cycle  propagation.  This  paper  provides  a  starting  point  for  incor 
poration  of  this  phenomenon  in  monetary  models  of  the business  cycle 
suitable  for policy  analysis.  Like  the  benchmark  New  Keynesian  model 
with  fixed  product  variety,  the  benchmark  model  of  this  paper  has 
shortcomings  from  an  empirical,  quantitative  perspective.  Combined 
with  the  procyclical  response  of  entry  to  productivity  shocks,  price 
stickiness  induces  excessive  countercyclicality  of markups  relative  to 
the data.  However,  the model  highlights  realistic  consequences  of prod 
uct  creation  subject  to  sunk  costs  (persistence),  a new  motive  for price 
stability,  and  a new  connection  between  monetary  policy  and  equity 
prices  that  is not  featured  in  the previous  New  Keynesian  literature.  The 
ability  of  the model  to generate  procyclical  producer  entry  and  profits 
(even  in  the presence  of  such  countercyclical  markups)  significantly  im 
proves  on  the New  Keynesian  benchmark  with  respect  to  these  stylized 
facts.  Quantitative  extensions  to  address  remaining  empirical  short 
comings?for  instance,  the  introduction  of  congestion  effects  in  entry 
that would  dampen  the  procyclicality  of  real wages  and  the  counter 
cyclicality  of markups?would  be  easy  to pursue.52  Thus,  we  view  the 
model  of  this  paper  as  a promising  stepping  stone  for  future  research  on 
a variety  of positive  and  normative  questions  in potentially  richer mon 
etary  models  with  endogenous  producer  entry. 
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Endnotes 
1.  See,  for  instance,  the  IMF's  GEM  model  (illustrated  by  Laxton  and  Pesenti  2003,  among 
others)  and  the  Federal  Reserve  Board's  SIGMA  model  (illustrated  by  Erceg,  Guerrieri, 
and  Gust  2005,  among  others). 
2.  Rotemberg  and Woodford  (1995)  addressed  the  implausibility  of  positive  steady-state 
profits  by  assuming  increasing  returns  to  scale  induced  by  fixed,  per-period  costs.  How 
ever,  under  this  assumption,  any  shock  that  causes  profits  to  fall  below  zero  should  gen 
erate  exit  and  induce  a nonlinearity  in  firm  decisions. 
3.  See  Campbell  (1998),  Chatterjee  and  Cooper  (1993),  and  Devereux,  Head,  and  Lapham 
(1996a,  b). We  illustrate  similar  evidence  in Bilbiie,  Ghironi,  and  Melitz  (2005). 
4.  Bernard,  Redding,  and  Schott  (2006)  measure  new  goods  at  a  relatively  coarse  level  of 
disaggregation:  a  5-digit  U.S.  SIC  code.  Contributions  of  product  creation  at  a more  dis 
aggregated  level  would  be  substantially  higher.  See  Bilbiie,  Ghironi,  and  Melitz  (2005)  for 
further  details. 
5.  Although  the  level  of  product  substitutability  can  be  very  high  in  the  Broda  and Wein 
stein  (2007)  sample,  their  evidence  suggests  that  product  creation  is concentrated  in prod 
uct  categories  that  are much  more  differentiated  (nonfood  products). 
6. We  choose  the  Rotemberg  model  over  the  familiar  Calvo-Yun  (1983,  1996)  setup  to 
avoid  heterogeneity  in prices  within  and  across  cohorts  of  price-setters  that  entered  at dif 
ferent  dates.  Earlier  flexible-price  business  cycle  models  with  monopolistic  competition 
and  endogenous  entry  also  include  Ambler  and  Cardia  (1998)  and  Cook  (2001).  Comin 
and  Gertler  (2006),  Jaimovich  (2004),  Jovanovic  (2006),  and  Stebunovs  (2006)  are more  re 
cent  contributions  to  the  theoretical  literature.  See  BGM  for  a  discussion  of  the  relation 
with  our  model. 
7.  There  is a one-to-one  mapping  between  a product,  a producer,  and  a  firm,  in our model. 
For  consistency  with  recent  literature,  we  routinely  use  the word  firm  to  refer  to  an  indi 
vidual  unit  of  production.  The  latter  is best  thought  of  as  a production  line  associated  with 
a  specific  good.  These  goods  can  potentially  be  introduced  within  incumbent  firms,  where 
product  managers  independently  make  profit-maximizing  decisions  for  their  production 
lines.  Our  model,  thus,  does  not  address  the  boundaries  of  the  firm. 
8. When  we  augment  the  model  to  include  physical  capital  in  production  of  existing 
goods  and  creation  of  new  production  lines,  the model  does  better  than  the  standard  RBC 
framework  at matching  volatility  and  persistence  of  U.S.  GDP.  However,  a  high  rate  of 
capital  depreciation  is  required  for  the model  to have  a unique,  nonexplosive  solution. 
9.  The  issue  of what  inflation  rate  should  be  targeted  by  policy  is  also  related  to  an  em 
pirically  relevant  measurement  problem  that  occurs  because  CPI  data  do  not  account  for 
the  introduction  of  new  goods  in  the welfare-consistent  manner  prescribed  by  the model. 
As  a consequence,  the  observed  CPI  is a biased  measure  of  the welfare-based  cost-of-living 
index,  as  documented  by  a  recent  and  growing  literature?see,  for  example,  Broda  and 
Weinstein  (2006).  Broda  (2004)  argues  that  the  central  bank  should  stabilize  CPI  inflation. 
This  is not  inconsistent  with  the  prescription  of  our  model  if  measured  CPI  inflation  is 
closer  to  average  product  price  inflation  than  to welfare-based  consumer  price  inflation. Monetary  Policy  with  Endogenous  Entry & Product  Variety  347 
10.  Kerr  and  King  (1996)  and  Clarida,  Gali,  and  Gertler  (2000)  were  the  first  to derive  this 
result  in  the  now-standard  New  Keynesian  framework.  Leeper  (1991)  has  a  related  dis 
cussion. 
11.  The  same  holds  for welfare-consistent  CPI  inflation,  subject  to  the  caveat  implied  by 
our  normative  analysis?that  monetary  policy  should  not  target  welfare-consistent  con 
sumer  prices  in our  model. 
12.  Sbordone  (2002)  showed  that  using  this  corrected  measure  does  not  affect  the  esti 
mates  obtained  when  using  the  baseline  markup  proxy.  Our  framework  suggests  a  specific 
calibration  scheme  for  the  share  of  overhead  labor  used  in  this  correction,  based  on  the 
share  of  labor  used  for  creating  new  products. 
13.  For  completeness  of  comparison,  we  also  consider  a  version  of  the model  in which 
new  price-setters  simply  set  their  initial  price  as  a  constant  markup  over  marginal  cost. 
14.  The  models  in Lewis  (2006)  and  Elkhoury  and Mancini  Griffoli  (2006)  are  in principle 
subject  to one  of  the  problems  that  our  approach  aims  to  address:  they  rely  on monopoly 
power  as  a  stepping  stone  for  nominal  rigidity,  but  they  abstract  from  entry  (by workers 
or  lawyers)  in  the  presence  of monopoly  profits. 
15. We  relax  this  assumption  in  the  following. 
16.  Symmetry  of  the  equilibrium  will  imply  /?,_i(w) 
= 
Pt-i^^ 
17.  If vt(u>) <  wJEt/Zt,  prospective  entrants  will  not  be  willing  to  incur  the  sunk-entry 
cost,  resulting  in zero  entry. 
18. We  omit  the  transversality  conditions  for bonds  and  shares  that must  be  satisfied  to en 
sure  optimality. 
19.  Sbordone  (2002)  indeed  showed  that  using  this  corrected  measure  does  not  affect  the 
estimates  obtained  when  using  the baseline  markup  proxy.  Our  framework  suggests  a  spe 
cific  calibration  scheme  for  the  share  of  overhead  labor  used  in  this  correction,  namely:  LJ 
L = 
8(  |x  -1)  /  (r +  8|jl), where  we  denote  steady-state  levels  of  variables  by  dropping  the  sub 
script  t.  Under  our  baseline  parameterization  that  follows,  this  is approximately  0.20;  the 
upper  bound  suggested  by  the  empirical  results  of  Basu  and  Kimball  (1997)  is 0.25. 
20.  We  leave  estimation  of  Phillips  curves  using  these  alternative  profit-based  proxies  for 
the markup  for  future  research. 
21.  Returning  to  the  normative  prescription?that  the  central  bank  should  stabilize  pro 
ducer  prices?our  model  implies  that  if the  central  bank  targeted  CPI  inflation,  the  bias  in 
its  measurement  would  indeed  be  beneficial  to  the  extent  that  biased  CPI  inflation  is closer 
to producer  price  inflation  than  welfare-consistent  consumer  price  inflation. 
22.  We  consider  rules  featuring  a  response  to GDP  YRt  in  section  7. 
23.  This  argument  does  not  hinge  on  having  removed  the  variety  effect  from  equity  prices 
and  dividends.  The  same  argument  can  be made  by  using  the  Phillips  curve  equation  (7) 
and  the  no-arbitrage  condition  in welfare-consistent  terms. 
24.  Details  are  available  on  request. 
25.  The  problem  is only  partially  solved  by  the  introduction  of  capital  adjustment  costs 
(introduced  in order  to  endogenize  the  price  of  capital).  Carlstrom  and  Fuerst  show  that 348 Bilbii, Ghironi,  and Melitz 
the  Taylor  Principle  is  restored  for  forward-looking  rules  only  for  empirically  implausible 
parametrizations  of  the  adjustment  cost. 
26.  Rule  (15)  is by  no  means  the  only  interest  rate  rule  that  implements  the  optimal  mon 
etary  policy.  It  is, of  course,  possible  to design  alternative  rules  that  achieve  this  goal. 
27.  Empirically,  job destruction  is  induced  by  both  firm  exit  and  contraction.  In our  model, 
the  death  shock  8  takes  place  at  the  product  level.  In  a multiproduct  firm,  the  disappear 
ance  of  a product  generates  job  destruction  without  firm  exit.  Since  we  abstract  from  the 
explicit  modeling  of multiproduct  firms,  we  include  this  portion  of  job destruction  in 5. As 
a higher  8  implies  less-persistent  dynamics,  our  choice  of  8  is also  consistent  with  not  over 
stating  the  ability  of  the model  to generate  persistence. 
28.  It  may  be  argued  that  the  value  of  6  results  in  a  steady-state  markup  that  is  too  high, 
relative  to  the  evidence.  However,  it  is  important  to  observe  that,  in models  without  any 
fixed  cost,  0/(6 
- 
1)  is  a measure  of  both  markup  over  marginal  cost  and  average  cost.  In 
our  model  with  entry  costs,  free  entry  ensures  that  firms  earn  zero  profits  net  of  the  entry 
cost.  This  means  that  firms  price  at  average  cost  (inclusive  of  the  entry  cost).  Thus,  al 
though  0 =  3.8  implies  a  fairly  high  markup  over  marginal  cost,  our  parametrization  de 
livers  reasonable  results  with  respect  to pricing  and  average  costs.  The  main  qualitative 
features  of  the  impulse  responses  that  follow  are  not  affected  if  we  set  0 = 
6,  resulting  in  a 
20  percent  markup  of  price  over  marginal  cost,  as  in Rotemberg  and Woodford  (1992)  and 
several  other  studies. 
29.  This  requires  x 
=  0.924271. 
30.  The  responses  of  several  macroeconomic  variables  deflated  by  average  prices  (the  pro 
ducer  price  level  pt)  rather  than  with  the  consumption-based  price  index  are  qualitatively 
similar.  For  instance,  CRt  increases  with  a hump-shaped  response,  except  when  policy  re 
sponds  to welfare-based  CPI  inflation.  YRt  also  rises,  although  without  a hump. 
31.  Results  from  policy  rules  featuring  a  response  to GDP  are  available  on  request. 
32.  The  inelastic  labor  case  is  in  round  markers;  cp 
=  2  in  cross  markers;  and  cp 
=  4  is  in 
square  markers. 
33.  Note,  however,  that  Bergin  and  Corsetti  find  that  unconditional  correlations  between  a 
measure  of  expansionary  monetary  policy  and measures  of  entry  (gross  or net)  are  negative. 
34.  We  should  note,  however,  that  if  the  economy  started  from  a  situation  of  zero  entry  (in 
which  the  free-entry  condition  holds  with  inequality,  v  <  wfE/Z,  and  NE 
= 
0),  a  strong 
enough  monetary  expansion  could  induce  an  increase  in  share  prices  that  brings  the  econ 
omy  to  the  entry  region  studied  in  this  paper  (in  which  the  entry  condition  holds  with  equal 
ity  and  there  is a positive  mass  of  entrants  at  all  times).  In  that  case,  expansionary  monetary 
policy  would  have  an  expansionary  effect  on  entry  in  this  version  of  the model  as well. 
35.  The  empirical  literature  has  downplayed  the  role  of  exogenous  monetary  policy  as  a 
source  of  fluctuations,  focusing  instead  on  the  role  of  systematic  policy  in  response  to eco 
nomic  conditions  as  a mechanism  for  propagation  of  the  cycle  (see,  for  instance,  Leeper, 
Sims,  and  Zha  [1996]). 
36.  The  period  utility  function  is defined  over  leisure  (1 
- 
Et)  in King  and  Rebelo  (1999), 
where  the  endowment  of  time  in  each  period  is normalized  to  1. The  elasticity  of  labor 
supply  is  then  the  risk  aversion  to variations  in  leisure  (set  to  1  in  their  benchmark  cali 
bration)  multiplied  by  (1 
- 
L)/E,  where  L  is  steady-state  effort,  calibrated  to  0.33.  This 
yields  cp 
=  2  in our  specifications. Monetary  Policy  with  Endogenous  Entry & Product  Variety  349 
37.  Of  the  various  labor  share-based  empirical  measures  of  the markup  considered  by 
Rotemberg  and Woodford,  the  one  that  is  most  closely  related  to  the markup  in our  model 
is  the  version  with  overhead  labor,  whose  cyclicality  is  reported  in  column  2 of  their  table 
2  (p.  1066),  and  reproduced  in  figure  5.4.  As  mentioned  previously,  this  is  because 
markups  in our  model  can  be  written  as  the  inverse  of  the  share  of  labor  (in  consumption 
output)  beyond  the  overhead  quantity  used  to  set  up  new  product  lines,  |x( 
= 
Yf  /[wt(Lt 
- 
EEt)].  There  is,  of  course,  an  additional  issue:  this measure  is  specified  as  a  share  of  con 
sumption  output,  not  GDP,  as  in Rotemberg  and Woodford.  For  issues  pertaining  to  cycli 
cality,  however,  this makes  little  difference,  since  the  share  of  consumption  in GDP  is  rel 
atively  acyclical. 
38.  Firm-level  real  profits  dR  t  increase  on  impact  following  a  favorable  productivity  shock 
with  persistence  0.979,  but  quickly  drop  below  the  steady  state  and  return  to  it  from  be 
low.  It  is expansion  in Nt  that  boosts  DRt  above  the  steady  state  throughout  the  transition, 
with  a hump-shaped  response  (figure  is available  on  request). 
39.  The  link  between  inflation  and  equity  prices  reflected  in  (9) and  discussed  at  length  in 
the baseline  model  now  disappears,  precisely  because  marginal  cost  is no  longer  tied  to  the 
value  of  the  firm. 
40.  Instead  of  vt, which  does  not  move,  we  report  the  response  of  vRt, which  shows  a de 
cline  in  the  data-consistent  price  of  investment  in  response  to  the  shock.  Note  that  the  re 
sponse  of  vE coincides  with  that  of NEi,  since  vE = 
vtNEr 
41.  Computing  the  time  profile  of  the markup  correlation  with  the  cycle  in  this  case  results 
in no  significant  improvement  relative  to  the  benchmark  model. 
42.  Unless  we  introduce  additional  ad  hoc  costs  of  adjusting  the  number  of  firms  along  the 
lines  of  familiar  costs  of  adjusting  capital. 
43.  To  further  understand  this,  observe  that  the  cost  of  creating  a new  product  in  real  units 
(purged  of  the  variety  effect)  is wRtfEt  /Zt  in  the  benchmark  model,  where  wRt 
= 
wt/pt,  and 
division  by  pt 
= 
(Nf  )1/(e_1) removes  the  pure  variety  effect.  In  the modified  model,  absent 
changes  in market  regulation  (i.e.,  setting/?f 
= 
1),  the  cost  of  creating  a  new  product 
purged  of  the  variety  effect  is  l/pr  Expansion  in product  variety  thus  lowers  this  cost  of 
product  creation  through  the  pure  variety  effect,  while  wRJEt  /Zt  is  invariant  to  the  latter. 
44.  A  further  alternative  specification  would  combine  the  two  assumptions  by  positing 
that  entry  requires  a Cobb-Douglas  combination  of  labor  and  materials.  The  properties  of 
responses  to  shocks  would  then  depend  on  the  relative  share  of  these  two  inputs  in  firm 
creation.  We  leave  the  development  of  this  version  of  the model  (and  the  incorporation  of 
traditional  physical  capital)  for  future  work. 
45.  Fabiani,  Gattulli,  and  Sabbatini  (2004),  Gautier  (2006),  and  Hoeberichts  and  Stockman 
(2004)  find  evidence  of  higher  price  flexibility  in more  competitive  sectors  of  the  econ 
omies  they  consider.  To  the  extent  that  entry  is more  prevalent  in more  competitive  sec 
tors,  this  evidence  may  be  suggestive  of  a  connection  between  entry  and  price  stickiness. 
Hoffmann  and  Kurz-Kim  (2006)  analyze  consumer  prices  in Germany  over  the  period 
1998-2003,  taking  into  account  the  effect  of  product  replacements.  They  report  that  the  in 
cidence  of  price  changes  increases  when  replacements  are  taken  into  account  (although  it 
is not  clear  that  replacements  are  truly  new  products  or  just  newly  adopted  products  in a 
particular  outlet). 
46.  As  a by-product,  the model  in  the  appendix  also  extends  Rotemberg's  (1982)  original 
model  by  removing  the  assumption  of  a nature-given  initial  price. 350 Bilbii, Ghironi,  and Melitz 
47.  We  log-linearize  the model  around  the  same  steady  state  with  zero  inflation  in  all 
prices  as  the  benchmark  model,  to  facilitate  the  comparison  of  responses  to  shocks. 
48.  The  price  index  Pt  is closer  than  Pt  to  empirical  CPI  data  for  the  reason  previously  dis 
cussed,  that  data  do  not  account  for  availability  of  new  products  at  the  frequency  relevant 
for  our  model  and  in  the  form  tied  to  our  preference  specification.  Given  any  variable  Xt 
in units  of  consumption,  the  data-consistent  counterpart  in  the  extended  models  is  thus 
defined  as: XR, 
= 
PtXt  /Pt.  See  Ghironi  and  Melitz  (2005)  for  further  discussion. 
49.  The  inflation  rate  tv]  measures  the  change  in  the  initial  price  set  by  those  that  entered 
at  t -  1 relative  to  those  that  entered  at  t -  2. 
50.  The  (Ramsey)  optimal  rate  of  inflation  would  be  non-zero  in  a  second-best  environ 
ment  in which  lump  sum  instruments  are  unavailable.  The  monetary  authority  would 
trade  the welfare  costs  of  inflation  against  the welfare  costs  of markup  variation  coming 
from  both  a  time-varying  elasticity  of  substitution  and  the misalignment  of  the  benefit  of 
extra  variety  with  the  profit  incentive  provided  by  the markup.  We  leave  this  extension  for 
future  research. 
51.  Not  surprisingly,  lowering  the  value  of  the  nominal  rigidity  parameter  k below  Ire 
land's  (2001)  estimate  improves  the  performance  of  the  sticky-price  translog  model  in 
terms  of markup  cyclicality  at  leads  and  lags.  However,  the  contemporaneous  correlation 
with  GDP  remains  excessively  negative  (-0.81),  even  with  k as  low  as  5. 
52.  Congestion  effects  would  also  dampen  the  positive  response  of  entry  to  monetary  ex 
pansions  when  entry  requires  materials. 
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